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H – 4315

International Court of Justice

H4315 – 0002

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Rapport du Gouvernement Polonais

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
NUREMBERG, GERMANY
Exhibit RF 127
Filed Jan 21, 1946

Filed
Exhibit
NUREMBERG, GERMANY
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL

Filed Jan 21, 1946

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S T A T E M E N T

OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT

IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT

OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS

# LIVRE DE DOCUMENTS
# HOLLANDE
# SECTION ECONOMIQUE No.

B 45775

STATEMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT IN VIEW OF THE PROSECUTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS.

A. During the war until the capitulation. (10 - 14 May 1940).

Concerning the violation of the laws and customs of war the Netherlands Government wishes for the time being to confine itself to an indictment concerning the aerial bombardment of Rotterdam on the 14th May 1940,1), as a result of which the inner-city of Rotterdam was destroyed completely (see enclosure a sent to British Foreign Office).

The particular criminal feature of this was the fact, that whereas at 13.20 an ultimatum with a term of validity of three hours was handed over, the bombardment started at 13.30, thus long before this period of three hours in which the capitulation of the town was still allowed, had expired. (see enclosure b)



1) See the report of the Burgomaster of Rotterdam sent to the Office of United States Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality by the Netherlands Representative on 4th September 1945. and to the British War Crimes Executive on 28 September 1945.

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B. During the occupation ( 14th May 1940 - 4th May 1945).

Whereas the German Government always has admitted that it was bound to the regulations respecting the laws of war on land, annexed to the Hague Convention respecting the laws and customs of war on land of 1907, Germany as occupant has constantly acted in violation of these Regulations, and even in a way which is contrary to all conceptions of humanity.

The policy persued by Germany in the occupied Netherlands was not laid down by the local occupying authorities, but was carried out in such a systematic and organised way, that it is clear that this policy was requested by the German Government itself and consequently the German Major War Criminals must be held responsible herefore.

Here follows a summing up of a number of war crimes committed by the German Government during the occupation.

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1. Setting aside of the Netherlands Legislation.

Article 43 of the "Regulations respecting the laws and customs of war on land" states:

> "The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented the laws in force in the country".

Although much depends here on the interpretation of "unless absolutely prevented" and this interpretation rests in fact with the occupant himself, it nevertheless remains clear that the right to introduce modifications in the legislation may be justified only by the military interests of the occupant. Even where the occupant is convinced of the injustice of the legal structure which he finds in the occupied country, this can never entitle him to declare his own legislation applicable as a whole, or to change the prevailing laws in the occupied country completely according to his wishes. This, however, Germany did, by making overall changes in the Netherlands legislation on a national socialistic basis. The legislative bodies were set aside. The State Council (Raad van State) was completely eliminated from the legislation. The Provincial and Municipal law was abolished. The judicial organisation was modified radically in several repects. Contrary to the Netherlands Constitution, before which all, who are on Netherlands Territory are entitled to protection as regards person and belongings, an extensive discrimination at the expense of the Jews was introduced.

The whole social life was distorted without regard to the prevailing laws concerning the press, education, social Services, corporate life, trade-unionism, medical care, art, science and the industrial and economic life. The ~~common~~ civil law and penal law was changed in many respects, in a national socialistic sense. The legislation concerning Netherlands nationality was modified in several points in favour of Germany. There was hardly an aspect of Government in which the occupant did not interfere.

That, for the carrying out this modified legislation, N.S.B.ers were frequently used in Government posts of all kinds, in the judiciary and in the civil service, made these changes in the laws very difficult to bear for the Netherlands population.

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2. Murder and ill-treatment of civilian population.

Article 46 declares among other things, that "the lives of persons must be respected". Contrary to this the occupant has not shown any respect for the lives of Netherlands men and women. Immumerable are the cases of murder and ill-treatment of Netherlanders.

It is quite understandable that the German Occupant should have prosecuted and convicted Netherlanders for sabotage and other crimes against the occupant. Again objections cannot be raised against the institution of extraordinary courts for this purpose and the establishment of special prison-camps in Holland as well as in Germany in which suspects and convicts were lodged. What, however, does definitely offend against all rules of humanity as well as violating the above mentioned provision of the Hague regulations, is the way in which the suspects and convicts were treated during the examinations and during imprisonment (see enclosure c).

On 15th March 1943 the members of the district court in Amsterdam (see enclosure d) expressed their indignation at conditions in the prison-camps at Ommen and declared that, if this state of affairs continued, they could no longer cooperate in the prosecution and trials of persons, who, if sentenced, ran the risk of being placed in that camp.

The conditions in the camp at Amersfoort and at Vught have also called for severe criticism. As regards Vught, details are to be found in the report of Major A.J.C. Hirst, Civil Affairs Legal Officer, who investigated this case in 1944. (see enclosure e). In particular the "Women in the Cell" incident in January 1944, mentioned on pag.11 of this report, is a striking example of atrocities committed against prisoners. In September 1944, before evacuating the camp 400 to 500 persons were killed.

The provision of protection of life was especially violated in respect of the Jewish Netherlanders, who were put in large numbers in a special camp at Westerbork and a large proportion of whom (105000 persons) were deported from there to Poland; of these deportees in August 1945 only 5000 were still living. Of the 140000 Jews who lived in the Netherlands in the beginning of the war, only 23000 remain. The treatment in the said camp the transports to Poland and eventually the wholesale murdering which must have taken place there, are certainly among the major crimes of the Major War Criminals (see enclosure f)

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Finally as an example of the attack on private lives there is the organisation of famine conditions in the Netherlands as a means for the suppression of the national resistance and and as an act of vengeance, in particular the embargo on food transports across the Ijsselmeer, with the result that famine conditions reigned in the Western Provinces, where one half of the population of the Netherlands lives. 50.000 Dutchmen died as a result of the famine, and the health of many others has been impaired. (see enclosure g).

"Family Rights", respect for which is especially emphasised in art. 46, were completely set aside as a result of the absence, extending over years, of hundreds of thousands of men, taken hostage, imprisoned, interned or sent to work in Germany.

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3. Violation of Private Property.

The rule that "private property must be respected", has also been completely ignored by the occupying authorities.

In the first place the expropriation of the property of the Royal House is a violation of this rule. Although neither the Hague regulations nor international law in general has any provision for making the possessions of the Head of the State inviolable to the enemy, no exeption is made in the general rule of inviolability for private property where the Head of the State is concerned; the law can only be set aside in respect of the Head of the State in such cases where the principle also fails to apply to the private individual.

By their policy of plundering Netherlands industry and agriculture the occupying authorities acted in a manner completely contrary to the rule of the respect for private property. In particular the German organisation Rüstungsinspektion was instrumental in removing from Netherlands factories innumerable machines and other industrial appliances, as a result of which the Netherlands industry and agriculture will for a long time be hampered in their development.

In spite of art. 56 which gives additional protection to "institutions dedicated to education, the arts and sciences", and provides that these "even when State property shall be treated as private property," all kinds of material was removed from large earned institutions, such as museums, libraries laboratories. This action, and also the removal of bells from a number of churches, undoubtedly violates the provision of art. 56, section 2, as follows: "All seizure of, destruction or willful damage done to institutions of this character, historic monuments, works of art and science is forbidden, and should be made the subject of legal proceedings".

Action taken against a large number of non-commercial associations, whose property in money and goods was confiscated, also deserves mention. At first these measures were chiefly directed against Jewish and masonic organisations; later other societies were liquidated; and the most diverse associations and organisations were affected.

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Theft from individuals took the most diverse forms. There was the imposition of individual or collective fines, the use of confiscation as subsidiary punishment, often exclusively for alleged Deutschfeindlichkeit (See Verordening 1940, No. 33, 1), and this in spite of the fact that Art. 46 Section 2 specially lays down: "Private Property cannot be confiscated".

Although private property is particularly protected against plundering by Art. 47 of the Hague Regulations, in the unequivocal words "Pillage is formally forbidden", there was a systematic and organised pillage of all houses after the evacuation of Arnhem. The same thing happened in other towns and villages. The booty was sorted and sent to Germany.

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4. Requisitioning of Goods and Services.

Concerning the requisitioning of goods - the exception to the rule of the inviolability of private property which is permitted according to the Hague Regulations - the German occupant failed in a number of ways to abide by the relevant rules as set out in Art. 52. Goods requisitioned for the German occupant were not exclusively intended "for the needs of the army of occupation", but were sent in vast quantities into Germany.

Even less were they "in proportion to the resources of the country". Towards the end of the war especially when the situation in Holland was particularly acute, food, clothing, and other goods were sent out of the country to such a degree, that "the resources of the country" were seriously reduced.

Neither was the rule observed that such "requisitions should only be demanded on the authority of the commander in the locality occupied"; orders for requisitioning were sent from all kinds of different authorities, both low and high.

Although the above mentioned article lays down that recompence must be given for goods handed over, payment was in many cases in arrears; where monetary payment was in fact made, it constituted no recompence, since the goods requisitioned - bicycles, textiles, radios, and so on - could not be replaced.

Finally another section of Art. 52, the contravention of which is extremely serious, declares that both "requisitions in kind" and "services" must be "of such a nature as not to involve the inhabitants in the obligation of taking part in military operations against their own country". This rule has been abused in all possible ways. Not only were goods sent to Germany with a view to use for the German war effort, but various industries in Holland itself, in particularly the metal industry, were forced to work for the Germans. And in addition Dutchmen were made to work on preparations for the defence of the Netherlands, and in Germany were obliged to work for the German war effort in the factories. Deportations of Dutchmen took place on a large

scale . . .

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scale (see enclosure h.), sometimes under the guise of voluntary labour, sometimes not, and often under inhuman conditions, of rounding-up, transport, maintenace and general treatment. (See the dossier of Goering, Sauckel, Stahtfanger of the U.N.W.C.C. Charge No. 95 List 6 Nos. 859, 862, 863).

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5. Collective penalties. (See the dossier Seyss Inquart of the U.N.W.C.C. Charge No. 3 List 1 No. 175)

In contravention of the rule in Art. 50 "no general penalty pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly or severally responsible". The German occupant frequently punished people for crimes which they did not commit. At first this took the form of the taking of hostages in advance, who were placed in a camp, and of whom 5 were shot, following a crime committed against Germany in Rotterdam on 15th August 1942. In later years there were innumerable other cases in which punishments were inflicted collectively or on individuals other than those who actually committed a crime. This includes the so-called exorbitant expiatory fines as well as imprisonment. An instance is the treatment of the population of Putten, where punishment took place on a large scale, as well as other individual cases (for instance in the Lairessestraat at Amsterdam, where some persons were shot for crimes in which they were in no way involved). Already in July 1944 600 people had been shot according to the official register In connection with the attack on Rauter about 400 new victims were shot on 7 March 1945.

Sometimes the family of the criminal was taken, but frequently victims were chosen quite arbitrarily, often from among those already in prison, or from among the inhabitants of houses in the vicinity of which the crime was alleged to have been committed. Sometimes there was an arbitrary choice from among the inhabitants of a town whre sabotage had taken place.

This idea of collective punishment was expressed not only in individual actions by the occupant, but was also laid down in decrees. An example is Verordening 1941, No. 7.

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6. Financial Control.

Some indications concerning financial control of an occupied country are given in Arts. 48 and 49, especially concerning the collection of taxes. These are not however binding. Although certain changes were made in the taxation system, the Germans preserved the taxation apparatus intact for the most part, and did not impose special taxes. Thus Germany did not avail herself of the powers given under the Hague Regulations for the levying of special taxes. She adopted other methods for the control of Dutch finance.

The amounts which the German Government desired to obtain from occupied territory were simply withdrawn from the Treasury, a system which led to financial malversation of various kinds. The lifting of the currency barrier between the Netherlands and Germany (see enclosure i), with the consequent defalcation in clearance balances, the tremendous increase in the National debt, camouflaged as purchases, all these factors contributed to an undermining of the Dutch monetary situation. In particular the lifting of the currency barrier has meant that financially and economically the Netherlands became actually part of the German Reich. In addition much gold bullion was transferred from the Netherlands Bank to the German Reichsbank in Berlin during the years from 1941 to 1943.

The Netherlands were forced to bear a great part of the costs of the war; these moneys were placed against the account of the occupied territory as costs for maintenace of the army of occupation. In reality the amounts impounded were far above the actual costs for the army of occupation.

As a result of all this the National Debt rose from f. 4000 million in 1939 to f. 12.800 million, to which must be added f. 330 million in State commitments for reconstruction and f. 4500 million for claims from the Netherlands Bank against the German Reich.

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7. Devastation not justified by military necessity.

In contravention of Art. 55 which declares that the Occupying State "shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructury of ....forests and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State", and which lays down that these must be "administered in accordance with the rules of usufruct", the occupant has severely damaged Dutch woods and forests by wholesale felling.

In the last phase of the war the occupant carried out thorough demolitions in the harbours of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, (See enclosure j), demolitions which originated in desire for vengeance and in a destructive spirit, and which were not strategically justified. (See on this point the authorities already quoted: Report of the acting General Manager of the Government Directorate of Roads and Bridges; report from the Superintendent of the Rotterdam Harbour; report of the Burgomaster of Rotterdam; report from the Superintendent of the Municipal Works, Amsterdam).

Finally a special kind of destruction was carried out in various places in the form of inundations. On 17 April 1945 the dike of the Wieringermeerpolder was blown up, and flooded to the depth of four and five metres of water. This polder of 20.000 hectares is a part of the Zuiderzee to be reclaimed and was a model of its kind with regard to agriculture and public works. All the houses in the polder have been destroyed, and the fertile land will be unuseable for years. (See enclosure k).

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8. Treatment of Prisoners of War.

The treatment by Germany of the Dutch prisoners of war was in many respects a contravention of the clauses of the Geneva Convention concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War (1929). Although it was not contrary to international law that the Dutch Officers who were released in 1940 were taken back into captivity in May 1942, the treacherous way in which it was done - they were summoned to Breda with the assurance that they would be able to return home the same day, and the sudden imprisonment came as a surprise - is certainly to be mentioned as a grievance against the German Government.

The manner in which the transport of prisoners of war was carried out, and the conditions in the transit camps and in some other camps constituted a breach of the above convention. Above all, however, the German Government can be charged with failing to respect sufficiently the status of prisoners of war. Thus three Dutch officers, who had been sent to a camp in Germany as prisoners of war, were taken to a prison in Holland in December 1942, and there tried for espionage and breach of parole. This trial resulted in their condemnation to death. The persons in question were enjoying prisoner of war status at the moment of their trial, and therefore the German authorities should have observed the articles of the Geneva Convention with respect to judicial proceedings against prisoners of war, among others that of Art. 60, that the Protecting Power should have been informed in time of the case, which was not done. (See enclosure 1 ).

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ENCLOSURES.

a. Photographs and map concerning the bombardment of Rotterdam, and one photograph of the demolitions in the harbour of Amsterdam.

b. Letter of the Supreme Commander of the Netherlands Army and Navy to the Burgomaster and Members of the Council of Rotterdam of 27th June 1940.

c. Extract of a number of forms for the "Honour List of Victims", concerning the treatment of Netherlands political prisoners during the German occupation. +

d. Letter to the Secretary General of the Netherlands Ministry of Justice from a number of members of the Court at Amsterdam concerning the conditions in prison camps.

e. Extract of a resume by Major A.J.C.Hirst, R.A. Civil Affairs, Legal Officer, of the results of investigations in the prison camp at Vught.

f. Extract of a report made by the Netherlands Government Commissioner for Repatriation Section East Europe, concerning the deportation of Jewish Netherlanders to Poland.

g. Report of the Government Bureau for the Food Distribution concerning the famine in 1944.

h. Report of the Central Bureau for Statistics about "The Deportation of Netherlands workmen to Germany."

i. Letter of the then President of the Netherlands Bank to the "Reichskommissar" of 18th December 1941 (in German).

j. Some figures of the Central Bureau for statistics concerning the demolitions of harbour ilstallations in Rotterdam. *

k. Report of the Dikereeve of the Weiringermeer about the inundations there.

l. Copy of a letter of the Netherlands Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State of 11th October, 1943.

* m. Destruction in the harbour of Rotterdam as a consequence of the bombardment of 14th May 1940 and of the demolitions by the German Wehrmacht as from September, 1944.

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6.

O.L.Z.
Concerning the speech of Dr. Seys Inquart,
regarding the bombardment of ROTTERDAM.

SUPREME COMMANDER
OF ARMY AND NAVY.

A.H.K. 27 June, 1940.

No. 146 P.

Subject: Speech of the State Commissioner. Dr. Seys Inquart.

On the occasion of his visit to Rotterdam, the State Commissioner, Dr. Seys Inquart made a speech in which he said, according to the press reports, that we had only ourselves to blame for the destruction of a part of Rotterdam. The State Commissioner added that this was not intended to be a reproach to the Netherland Commanders, because in the absence of leaders these Commanders had been hindered in their readiness to take decisions.

This way of presenting the facts is not in accordance with what actually happened, so that I found myself obliged to protest to Dr. Seys Inquart against his speech.

I therefore informed him that the fact that the Government removed itself - rightly - to safety, had not been of any detrimental influence on the Netherlands Commanders, and that it never occurred to me that the Commanders at Rotterdam had less ability in making quick decisions. Furthermore I said that it had not been our fault that Rotterdam had been bombarded.

As it will no doubt interest you to know what actually happened, I am giving you, in the following passages, the particulars with which I supported my protest.

On the 14th May at 10.30, the Commander at Rotterdam, Colonel Scharroo, received a written document containing an ultimatum instructing him to cease the defence immediately, or else the strongest measures would be taken against the town. The time limit of this ultimatum was two hours, consequently the answer had to be received at the latest by 12.30. As the letter was not signed, and the possibility of a hoax was not to be excluded, I sent a written note by return, stating that such a proposition could only be considered when it was authorised as being genuine and signed by a competent Commander.

This answer arrived at 12.15, that is, a quarter of an hour before the time limit expired, at its appointed destination - Noordereiland near Koningsbrug. The Dutch Captain Bakker, however, had to wait with a German Commander van Choltitz till 12.35 for the arrival of German Generals.

At 13.20 a new signed ultimatum, with a time limit of 3 hours, was handed over to Captain Bakker. With this he returned to the Netherlands Commander in the company of 2 German officers.

In the meantime at 13.22 when a formation of German planes was approaching, a red flare was fired, by the order of the German Lieutenant General Schmidt (according to German explanation as a sign that the bombardment should not take place) and at 13.25 this was repeated near the Southern bridgehead of the Willemsbrug by order of one of the two Germans who accompanied Captain Bakker. In spite of this the bombardment began at 13.30.

The previous facts show that, if the Germans had the intention to avert the bombardment, the measures taken by them failed, and the damage done to Rotterdam cannot be blamed on any lack of quickness in taking decisions on the Netherlands side. Because it is not possible for me to make this protest public through the press, I felt that I must, by this written document, acquit the Netherlands forces from the blam, thrown unjustly upon them, that they were the cause of the fate of Rotterdam.

The General,
Commander of Army and Navy,
w.s. H.G. Winkelman.

To: Burgomaster and
Members of the Council of Rotterdam.

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GOVERNMENT BUREAU FOR WAR DOCUMENTATION.

Directors:

Prof. Mr. N. W. Posthumus,
Leiden, Voorzitter.

Prof. Mr. B. H. D. Hermesdorf,
Nijmegen.

Prof. Dr. Z. W. Sneller,
Rotterdam.

The Hague, 21st September, 1945.

EXTRACT

from a number of forms for the "Honour List of victims" with relation to the treatment of Netherlands political prisoners during the German occupation.

1. Addicks, M.C. 53 years, shot in his own house by the S.D.Maartin Kuiper at Amsterdam, on the 6th September 1941.
2. Bloemgarten, R. 23 years, shot at Bloemendaal, on the 1st July 1943, after having lain with hands and feet shackled, in the Detention prison, Amstelveenscheweg at Amsterdam.
3. Boezeman, J.J.W. 26 years, shot at Scheveningen on the 9th January 1941 after ill-treatment by the Obersoharfuhrer of the S.S.Kokowsky and Schmidt.
4. Breur, K.M. 25 years, shot on the 5th February 1943 after having been amongst other places, at Scheveningen, where he had been, amongst other things, locked up so that he had to stoop all the time, and was beaten until he was deaf on one side.
5. ten Cate, J. 28 years, shot on a forced walk by Grune Polizie at Zuid-Laren on the 2nd August 1943, after having been severely ill-treated the night before.
6. Krauwels, P.N. 43 years. On the 8th September 1944, at Sittard, immediately after his arrest by the Ortscommandant, he was taken to the Town refuse dump and there tortured and shot.
7. van Driel, A. 39 years, shot on the 1st May 1945 at Utrecht, after appalling ill-treatment.
8. Gebben, J. 28 years, shot on the 3rd May, 1942 (place unknown) after horrible treatment at Amersfoort. (He had to undress at 22 degrees frost and was spouted with a jet from a fire-engine).
9. de Groot, J. 32 years, shot at Rotterdam on the 22nd December, 1944. A. S.D.man Hofman smashed one of his fingers.

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C

10. Hartholt, A. 63 years )
11. Hartholt, D. 27 years. ) These men, a father and 3 sons, were shot
12. Hartholt, A. 26 years. ) on the 3rd May 1943 in the German position
13 Hartholt, A. 26 years. ) at Trimunt-Marum.

14. Koekenberg, S. 27 years, died in the concentration camp at Harreveld, the 5th July 1945. Was beaten at Vught with red hot irons and locked in a cell, where the water came up to his waist.
15. Lagraauw, J. 32 years, shot with 5 others without motive or warning, at Wassenaar, on the 17th November, 1944.
16. Manten, H.C. 22 years, fought as a K.P. leader against the Germans at Westbroek on 5th May 1945. He fell into their hands, whereupon they stabbed him in the neck, put out his colleagues' eyes and shot them afterwards. The Germans threw the corpses in the ditch.
17. Manninga, P. 23 years, shot on 3rd May 1942 (place unknown), after bestial treatment.
18. Peppink, J. 24 years, deceased 2nd September 1941, at Wesermunde as a result of the horrible treatment at Scheveningen and Utrecht.
19. Pronk, G. 23 years, died at the Hague on 17th January 1944 as a result of torture and finally poisoning, in a concentration camp.
20. Roes, E.G. 22 years, shot at Haren on 28th May 1944 after having been forced to stand for 4 days without food, for interrogation in the Scholten-house at Groningen. During this interrogation three of his ribs were smashed.
21. van der Sande, K P. 27 years, shot at Utrecht on 1st May 1945 after the worst tortures.
22. Schuit, S.B. 39 years, shot at Scheveningen on 10th April 1943 after terrible interrogation and punishments. His head was smashed in several places.
23. Smit, C.T.J. 37 years, shot at Utrecht on 10th March 1944. After his arrest he was interrogated continuously for 80 hours.
24. Snellenbroek, A.M. 26 years, shot at Assen on 10th April 1945 after having been cured from severe wounds as a result of ill-treatment.
25. Surguin, G. 27 years, shot at Utrecht on 29th December 1942, after bestial ill-treatment at Arnhem.
26. Vastenhoud, K.D. 28 years, shot at Utrecht on 19th November 1942, after having been kicked in the face, amongst other things.

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27. Wallast. J.A.G. 32 years, shot at Amsterdam on 4th November, 1942, after severe ill-treatment, when, amongst other things, all his teeth were knocked out of his mouth.

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT

Subject : The investigation of Warcrimes committed by the Germans against J.L. GEBBEN.

## S T A T E M E N T.

In pursuance of the instruction to investigate Warcrimes committed by the Germans against Johan Lambertus GEBBEN, 28 year of age, Netherlander electrician, having lived at Delft, Fabriciusstraat No. 1, and died in the Spring of 1942 in Germany we : ----------

Johan Casper HOOGEVEEN, State Detective 1st class and Haitze WIERSMA, police-constable at Boskoop, both charged with the investigation of the above mentioned warcrimes, on Friday, September 28th 1945, at Montfoort heard : ----------

---------- Pieter de W I T, ----------

64 years of age, Netherlander, verger of the Netherlands Reformed Church, and living at Montfoord, Korte Kerkstraat A 134, who declared as follows:----------

"In Januari 1942 I was locked up for 4 days and nights in the prison at Utrecht. I was placed there in a cell with a certain GEBBEN, the same as meant by you. This boy was in the most miserable circumstances. He was starved and looked more like a skeleton then like a human being. I will report to you what he told me in this cell. He had been locked up in the prison at Scheveningen and received there for food boiled potato-peelings, which he had to eat in a very short time. As this usually was impossible, always part of it was wasted. As a result of the bad food he had fallen seriously ill, but no dokter had examined him. In this condition he was transferred to Utrecht, where I saw him. When he breathed, which was very difficult for him, his chest creaked. He showed me his back, which was quite raw, as a result of the beatings with a rubber truncheon. He had also been in the camp at Amersfoort. Both at Scheveningen and at Amersfoort he was repeatedly sprayed with ice-cold water in his cell, after being forced to strip. Whilst they were spraying he had to run up and down in his cell and if it did not go quick enough for the Gentlemen's liking, he got blows with the rubber truncheon. Through the force of the jet of water and his exhaustion he was thrown to the ground, where they left him naked on the cold stonefloor. His weight was, in my estimation, far below 100 Lbs. and he . . .

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looked like a man of 80 years. It was a dreadful sight. It moved me so much, that I sat whole nights weeping beside him. I often prayed for him and we used to sing hymns together. At Amersfoort he had known it happen, that he tried in his hunger, to pick a cabbage-leaf from the ground. The guards, who had noticed this beat him frightfully with a rubber truncheon. He had also seen with his own eyes in the camp at Amersfoort a prisoner, a Clergyman, beaten to death with a rubber truncheon. After my home-coming I heard from his family that he was executed by the Germans".

Read out aloud, admitted and signed in concept.

w.s. P. de Wilde.

Of which is made by us and signed this statement on oath of office at the Hague, 29th September 1945.

w.s. J.C. Hoogeveen w.s. H. Wiersma.

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CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DEPARTMENT.

SUBJECT : The investigation of war crimes committed by the Germans against S. Koekenberg.

## S T A T E M E N T.

In pursuance of the instruction to investigate war crimes committed by Germans against S.KOEKENBERG, we Johan Casper HOOGEVEEN, Rijksrechercheur le class at the Hague and Haitze WIERSMA, police constable le class, at Boskoop, both charged with the investigation of the above-mentioned war crimes, on Friday, 28th September 1945 at the Hague, heard :

Willen Jacobus KOEKENBERG, 37 years of age, Netherlander, employed as deputy clerk and living at the Hague, Ketelstraat 26, and who, after we had given him the necessary particulars and asked him to continue, declared as follows:

"I am a brother of Samuel KOEKENBERG, born at the Hague, 21st January 1917, Netherlander, builder, domiciled at Ketelstraat 26, The Hague, and deceased 5th July at Harreveld. My brother Samuel was arrested by the Germans in July 1944 in his house, on the grounds of refusal to comply with the order for forced labour in Germany, and taken to Scheveningen and later to Vught. As I visited my brother several times before his death in the Emergency hospital at Harrevelt, where he was taken by the English after the liberation, as a patient, I heard at first hand the following facts from him:-

To try to force him to name the leaders of the "Underground" who helped him with distribution of cards during the period that he had to go underground, they locked him in a cell, where the water reached to his waist. In this cell he was forced to stay for the period of 24 hours, twice,without food. In September 1944 he was transferred to Germany and ended up in a camp at Hamburg. As a result of an argument with a fellow prisoner, over a piece of bread, he was in this camp branded on one of his arms with a red hot iron. The wounds caused by this burning - they were several with surfaces bigger than a half-crown - I saw myself. On one occasion he was transported in one truck with 70 fellow prisoners from one camp to another. During this journey, which lasted eight days, no food or water was given to him or his companions. As a result of this the need became so great that he had to drink his own urine. As the truck was locked, all were forced to relieve nature in the truck. As a direct cause of this terrible condition, 30 of his fellow prisoners died during this journey.

My brother himself contracted tuberculosis as a result of the above-mentioned ill-treatment and misery, and died of it.

Read out aloud, admitted and signed in concept.

w.s. W.J.Koekenberg.

Of which is made by us and signed this statement on oath of office at the Hague, 29 September 1945.

w.s. J.C.Hoogeveen. w.s. H.Wiersma.

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d.

TRANSLATION OF A LETTER TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

OF THE NETHERLANDS MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.

Amsterdam, 15th March, 1943.

The undersigned, all members of the Court of Amsterdam, express their feeling to you Sir, that the present situation, where a large number of persons condemned by Netherlands tribunals, undergo their punishment or part of their punishment in the prison camp at Ommen, or in a prison camp in Germany, should not be continued any longer.

It is generally known that the treatment of those persons, especially the ones imprisoned in the camps at Ommen, is very unsatisfactory and contrary to the rules laid down in our Code of Penal procedure, Book V, title 1, 23rd paragraph, and to the law setting out the principles of the prison system, and to the decree concerning the prisons.

The undersigned do not deem themselves bound to go into detail in this letter with regard to the intolerable treatment of which the persons in the said camps are the victims, several complaints about that having already reached you. They think it sufficient to point out the alarming amount of deaths and the number of persons being treated in different hospitals in the country and in the sick-quarters at Ommen, who have been, or still are, in the said camps, amongst whom many cases of undernourishment, - even hunger-oedema - and signs of serious ill-treatment were found. In this connection they refer to the enclosures attached to this letter.

As loyal members of the judiciary following their duty, honour and conscience, they think it necessary to declare expressively that if these conditions continue, they cannot be expected to go on giving their co-operation in pronouncing sentences which render the condemned persons liable to execution in the said camps.

They submit to your kind attention that the form and methods of this execution causes everywhere in our country the greatest unrest and indignation, to the detriment of security, order and peace. In their opinion it needs no further demonstration that the executions, which fill the entire population with indignation, carried out in camps which are not under Netherlands direction and are withdrawn from the legally prescribed

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supervision of Netherlands authorities, make it impossible, not only for the judiciary, but also the investigation officers, to fulfil their task with the usual devotion and loyalty.

They all feel strong conscientious scruples that sentences of imprisonment imposed by Netherlands tribunals on male delinquents are executed in penal camps, contrary to the legal prescriptions, and the intention of the legislator and judge, in a way which renders the actual punishment more severe to such an extent as cannot be foreseen by the Judge when he determines the punishment. As far as it can now be foreseen, the situation is considered to be quite inadmissible.

They hand over to you the information obtained by them regarding the treatment in the said penal camps, which in their opinion is fully reliable, and a copy of a report summarising the findings and conclusions of those members of the judiciary who visited the camp at Ommen on March 5th, 1943.

With all appreciation for your efforts to bring about an improvement in these intolerable conditions, they feel, for the sake of their conscience, obliged to insist in all seriousness that you will promote, within the shortest possible time, the measures which will result in :

1) Closing down the camp at Ommen, or, in view of the shortage of accommodation, placing the camp under Netherlands directorate under the guidance of the Department of Justice and the supervision of the judiciary.
2) Penal sentences by Netherlands Courts in future to be exclusively executed in institutions in the Netherlands destined for that purpose, and according to the legal prescription applicable thereto.
3) A provision that if prisoners are to be used to perform labour in Germany, the execution of the punishment of these prisoners will be suspended, to that they will be able to go to Germany as free labourers.

The undersigned are of the opinion that a speedy solution in the sense suggested by them, should be found in this matter, whilst should these conditions continue, they will, as said before, no longer be able to co-operate in the prosecution and trial of persons who run

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d.

the risk, being sentenced, to be taken to a penal camp as mentioned above.

w.s. by the members of the Court.

/ Enclosures not attached to this translation, owing to their great length.

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Extract.

# VUGHT CAMP

## INTRODUCTION

Major A.J.C. Hirst R.A. Civil Affairs Legal Officer from No.5 Civil Affairs Group has made an investigation into happenings at this camp. The investigation lasted from 7th November to 20th December 1944. Major Hirst was not instructed to express any opinion, and the results of the investigation, consisting of two volumes, are contained in a number of statements and indices. Five copies were handed to Civil Affairs First Canadian Army for onward transmission.

On the 19th December 1944 Major Staniforth Civil Affairs Official War Historian at SHAEF requested Major Hirst to write a resumé of the results of the investigation. This appaers in the following pages.

## ATROCITIES

The atrocities alleged to have been perpetrated in the camp take many forms.

1. BEATINGS AND FLOGGINGS

There can be no doubt that "public" floggings on the parade ground in the presence of the Commandant the Doctor and other officers took place, the other prisoners being compelled to be spectators. The following extracts from the evidence of the two witnesses will suffice to show what transpired on such occasions.

"Men were brought to a wooden block in the presence of every-
"body, who had committed some small offence such as listening to the English
"radio in the rooms of one of the SS, stealing butter from the SS, making love
"to a woman prisoner or smoking sigabettes during work time. The prisoner
"was then put over the wooden block and beaten either by a Capo or another
"prisoner or an SS man. The strokes varied from 5 to 50. The man beaten had
"to count the strokes. At the end he had to thank the man who had beaten him".

"The prisoners to receive the beatings were made to bend over a
"block with their trousers stretched tight. Sometimes two sometimes three SS
"men would hold them over it, sometimes a Capo and sometimes a Dutch 'head' prisoner

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would . . .

"would do the beating. Officially the Dutch prisoners did the beating, but "very often after the Dutch prisoner had beaten his fellow prisoner I have "seen a Capo take the stick and beat him again. Very often after that an "officer would beat the same prisoner. It was an order that the Commandant "and the doctor should be present at the beatings and they were always present, "but I have never seen the doctor interfere. The beatings were not so severe as other camps I have been in."

The last witness goes on to say that as a Capo he was ordered to beat prisoners by the SS guards and that he had refused to carry out the order he himself might have been flogged or even shot.

Many other witnesses describe these official floggings. The condition of large numbers of the people so flogged was pitiful. Some could not walk back to their places on parade in which case they were left lying on the ground, being ultimately taken back to their hut in a wheelbarrow. There is evidence that in most cases the floggings drew blood.

Apart from organised beatings as described above there is a mass of evidence of assaults beatings and rough treatment by the Capos and SS guards on the prisoners in their charge. For the slightest departure from what the guard considered discipline and often for no reason at all the prisoner felt the butt end of a rifle or a stick across his back or other parts of his person.

For example a doctor states:-

"I was once beaten with a stick two blows on my behind by a "German SS guard. I was carrying stones and I could not do it quick enough. "That was why I was beaten".

Another witness states :-

"Many times I have seen prisoners beaten because they picked up "pieces of bread from the dustbins or because a man turned his head. They "were beaten with sticks by German SS officers".

These examples could be multiplied many times.

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SHOOTINGS

There can be no doubt on the evidence available that the commonest method of carrying out an execution was by means of shooting the condemned man. How many were shot during the history of the camp it is difficult to say. It can, however, be safely said that the numbers were large probably in the hundreds and possibly more than a thousand, and that they increased between July and September 1944. It is possibly that as many as two thousand were shot.

The method by which the victims were told of their impending death seems to have been as follows. On the evening parade certain names would be called out. These individuals then paraded separately before the Adjutant and were told by him that they were about to be shot. The same evening shots would be heard. The people whose names were so called were never seen again.

WOMEN IN CELL INCIDENT

This incident, involving 92 women prisoners, is the worst outrage in the history of the camp. It occurred on the night of 15/16th January 1944 and was expressly ordered by the then Commandant. Immediately after the event he left the camp having apparently been dismissed.

Many witnesses, while not concerned in the incident, speak of it and the details they give whilst not agreeing exactly are substantially the same and bear strong resemblance to the direct evidence of the matter.

The direct evidence is supplied by two Dutch women and one man. One of the women Mrs. Kuitert was one of the 92 affected, the other woman was imprisoned in a cell close by and heard much of what went on. The man visited the cell where the occurrence took place the following morning.

The events leading up to the atrocity were shortly these. A Dutch woman had been released and another woman alleged to have been of German nationality wrote to the Commandant complaining. Dutch women occupying the same hut on the night of Wednesday the 12th January 1944 drenched the woman's bed in water so that she had to sleep elsewhere. The leader of this escapade was a woman Versteeg. She told the German woman that if she complained to the Commandant she would cut off her hair. The woman lodged a complaint and on

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Thursday . . .

Thursday mid-day Versteeg carried out her threat and cut off some of the woman's hair. The same evening Versteeg was put in prison.

The other women in the hut, feeling equally to blame, told their wardress that they all wished to share punishment. The wardress took the numbers and Mrs. Kuitert who was one of them is certain that there were ninety one of them.

Nothing happened until Saturday the 15th. at about 6-30 p.m. at which time the witness was working at Phillips factory. A wardress entered and called out the names of a number of women. She ordered them to fall in behind her and she then proceeded to march them to the prison. On arrival they were marched upstairs where they were met by another wardress who told them they could go to the toilet. Each prisoner did so and then proceeded single file to the cells. Mrs. Kuitert was the first one to enter her cell and was followed by sixteen others. The Commandant was present and ordered the wardress to tell them "what you have told the others". Whereupon they were told that they were mutinous and ought to be shot. They must make no noise or the fireman would come and pour water on them. The Commandant added that the same thing would happen if they opened the little ventilation windows in the cell. Mrs. Kuitert continues:-

"The door was then shut and we heard the officers going away. "This was about 7 p.m. The cell was pitch dark. We counted ourselves as "seventeen. After some time (I do not know how long) I heard women crying "out as if in pain. This was near my cell. We also heard shuffling with "wooden shoes. The crying was growing every minute louder and louder. I "heard women crying "help, help". Then I realised the cries were coming "from the next door cell. I also thought there must be more than 17 from "the cries. I told that to the other prisoners but they said "That is "impossible as we are very crowded with 17". They thought there might be "17 in each cell. One of us knocked on the wall to make contact with the "cell next door. But they made no reply. Those in my cell were let out "at mid-day Sunday 16th January. Therefore I was in the cell with 16 others for 17 hours. I did not sleep, but a few slept. We all sat on the floor leaning against each other. The walls were wet. I suffer from asthma and

had . . .

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"had an attack of pain during the night. I could not breathe properly.
"A nurse who happened to be in the same cell took me in her arms and helped
"me. During all the 17 hours there was continuous crying and screaming from
"the next door cell. The air became foul and very oppressive in my cell.....
"I think it would be about 8 a.m. on the morning of the 16th January, that I saw a light in the corridor through the little glass window in the door of the "cell. I heard footsteps. I heard a key being turned in the door of the cell next door from which the cries had come. I think the door must have been "opened. At once I heard the most terrible crying and shouting. I cannot "describe how terrible it was. I heard the door banged again clearly. It "could not have been open for more than four seconds perhaps three seconds. "I am quite certain of this. Shouting and screaming continued. Afterwards I was told that it was the head woman wardress who opened the door and then "shut it against at once. I do not know her name but her nickname was "De "Knol" (this means "an old horse"). After the door was shut I heard footsteps going away. Crying and shouting continued and groans. In about half an hour "(but I cannot be certain of the time) I heard footsteps returning probably of more than one person. I again heard the key turned and the door opened "of the next door cell. When the door opened the shouting got feebler but I "heard much crying and sobbing and groaning. I distinctly heard De Knol say to someone "Do you recognise me". The noise next door except for sobbing was getting feebler and ..... I heard movements outside the cell of people "going away. A woman from outside spoke through the little glass window in our cell door. I heard her. She said "Are you here. Who is with you. Have "you any dead. We have dead"..... All talk then stopped abruptly".

At mid-day on the 16th January the seventeen women were removed from their cell. The Commandant was present. They were then split up and put into three cells, after being allowed to go to the toilet. At 5 p.m. the same day the witness got the first food she had had since 4 p.m. the previous day. At 8 p.m. on the 17th January they were taken before an SS officer whom they had never seen before who told them that three women had killed each other in the adjoining cell. Mrs. Kuitert describes this interview referring to the SS officer:- He said:-

"You must forget the number in your cell and the numbers in the

other . . .

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"other cell. Now you will be put in the huts again but you must never speak "neither here nor anywhere else, if you are ever freed, about what you have "heard or seen. If you are ever freed and it comes to our ears that you have "spoken about it, you will be arrested again and imprisoned for life".

He had a pile of papers in front of him. He told each one that she would have to sign one of the papers. The papers were all alike and the contents of one were read aloud by a wardress. It was in effect an undertaking not reveal to anyone the happenings on the night of the 15/16th January. Each women then signed adding her prison number.

As to what happened in the adjoining cell (apparently holding 75 women) the story is only second hand having been told to the witness quoted above by Mrs. Aussems a friend who was one of the women in the cell in question. By July 1944 both women had been set free and spent a forthight's holiday together, Mrs Kuitert describes Mrs. Aussems' story as follows:-

"She told me the following story about cell 115. When she entered "cell 115 she got the impression that it was already full, but still more "came in. The cell became so full that the door could not be shut easily. It "had to be kicked and pushed. It was pitch dark and she could not see who else "was in the cell or how many. A wardress before the door was shut told the "women that they must keep quiet and not open the window, otherwise the fire "guard would come and throw water over them..... Some women stood with their hands above their heads to make more room..... Some women became dizzy and unconcious..... the air had become terrible partly through complete lack of ventilation and partly because they could not go to the toilet. This was why some women became unconcious. Some women cried 'Open the windows'. Others said 'No the fireman will come'. Others said 'Anything better than foul air'. "The windows were difficult to open as the prison was new. The women were busy "with the windows for some hours. They finally got one or two windows open. "The inflow of the small amount of fresh air did not make a noticeable diffe- "rence as the air was so thick. The windows were of a sort which only opened three or four inches at the top..... All the women cried and groaned and "made repeated cries of 'help, help'. One woman finally appeared to go com- "pletely mad as her cries were terrible. The other woman tried to stop her "crying but the terrible cries and shrieks of the woman continued. The mad "woman began to try and tear off the clothes of the woman next to her, no one was sure anyone . . .

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"anyone was dead until the cell was opened. When it was opened finally they "all tried to get out quickly and they did not know how many were lying dead. "Mrs. Aussems remembered a wardress opening the cell door and shutting it "again in a few seconds. When it was opened two or three women fell out more "dead than alive. Others tried to get out. The wardress hit several women "in the face with her fists and got them all back in a few seconds. She then "banged the door. During the few seconds the door was open the light from the "corridor cast a little light into the cell. There were women with swollen lips "their faces wet with perspiration and their hair all tousled ..... When "Mrs. Aussems got out of the cell she fell down unconcious..... The "corridor was quite full and other women were lying on the ground..... Some "women had torn their dresses off as far as they could because of the heat and "others had had theirs torn off by mad women..... Versteeg returned to "the cell to try and find her dress..... She saw other torn dresses "wooden shoes and several women who appeared to be dead".

The fact that this episode resulted in the death of some of the women is confirmed by the evidence of a man who was a prisoner and who on the morning of the 16th was sent to clean out the cells. He states that he and other prisoners carried twelve corpses from the cells, he himself carrying two. They took the bodies to the crematorium.

During the days following, after the women had returned once more to normal camp life they carefully checked their numbers. There were 21 of them missing. However two subsequently joined them having been in hospital. The other nineteen were never seen again. The common belief in the camp was that twelve had died during the night in the cell and the other seven had gone mad and been removed to a hospital outside the camp. It is considered reasonably certain that 75 women were in the cell 115, namely 92 less 17.

Evidence has been obtained from another woman who was a prisoner in a cell only a little distance away from the cell where the tragedy occurred. She confirms the screamings, shoutings and groanings throughout the night. The next morning she looked through the peephole in the door of her cell and can speak as to the appearance of the women who had just been released.

I saw . . . .

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"I saw a lot of women coming into the corridor, some walked "out helping others in a state of collapse; their faces were awful; some of "them were blue. After they had gone from the corridor I saw several lying "on the corridor floor. I thought they were dead or unconcious, all of them "were taken away on stretchers by prisoners, some of them were nurses.....
" The same morning a prisoner who was acting as prison nurse spoke to me "through the peephole in my door. She told me that thirteen women prisoners "had died..... Upon my release from the cell I was sent to the hospital "suffering with my throat. Whilst there I spoke to several patients who were "amongst the women in the cell.....they told me that many had died in the "cell and others had gone mad. I saw several women who showed me teeth marks "and scratches on their legs and shoulders and arms. They said some had gone "mad and bitten them in their frenzy".

On the 30th November 1944 Major A.J.C. Hirst R.A. visited the cells in the prison accompanied by Mrs. Kuitert. The cells were identified by Mrs. Kuitert. Major Hirst took measurements of the cell where the 75 women spent the night. It is rectangular with a very small recess for the door. The cell is 3.80 metres long and 2.30 metres wide. The height is 2.35 metres. It has two windows each with four panes 24½ by 15 cm. Each window opens inward at the top and when fully open the top opening is about 25 cm. Outside the window there is a wooden shutter which blocks the view except for a few inches through which the sky can be seen.

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NETHERLANDS GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER FOR REPATRIATION

SECTION EASTERN EUROPE

# PART I: DEPORTATION OF JEWISH NETHERLANDERS TO POLAND.

## A) MEASURES PRECEEDING DEPORTATION.

### I) GERMAN MEASURES IN THE NETHERLANDS

For a better understanding of the measures preceeding the deportation of the Dutch Jews, the following survey is given, arranged in chronological order, of the measures, issued partly as "Vererdnungen" and partly as "Anordnengen etc., taken by the enemy against the group of Netherlands subjects.

July '40 Jews removed from Civil Defence services.

October '40 Marketing prohibition for Jews.

October '40 Registration at the "Wirtschafts-Prufstelle" of Jewish firms and of Limited Companies with one or more Jewish managers and/or directors; these firms etc were put under the management of a "Verwalter", to be "aryanised" or liquidated; Official definition of the term "Jew" (Vererdn.189/'40);

Nov.'40/ Jan'41 Dismissal of Jewish Officials;

Jan-March'41 Compulsory registration of Jews at the registers of population (Verordn.6/'41);

Febr.'41 Dismissal of other Jewish officials in Government service.

Febr.'41 Antisemitic riots in Amsterdam;

Febr.'41 Formation -on German orders- of the "Joodsche Raad"(Jewish Council) as liaison between the German authorities and the Dutch Jews - Jews no longer allowed to have contact with Netherlands officials.

Febr'41 Formation of the "Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswandering"-leader S.S.Obersturmfuehrer Aus der Fuente;

Febr.'41 First razzia; about 1.000 Jews gradually arrested and within a few months sent to Buchenwalde and /or Mauthausen; the ashes of these young men were offered to their relatives shortly afterwards against the payment of f.75.-

Spring'41 Jews forbidden to visit cinema's;

March'41 Jews removed from trade and industry (Vererdn.48/'41);

April'41 Burning of Synagogues in a number of towns in the provinces of Gelderland and Overijssel;

May'41 Registration and compulsory sale of arable land; Verdn.102/'41

May'41 Application of the Nuremberg laws on marriages and sexual contact between non-Jews and Jews; Jews were betrothed to non Jews were arrested and sent to concentration camps;

May '41 Jewish lawers, doctors and chemists were no longer allowed to have any but Jewish clients, patients respectively;

Summer'41 Jews no longer allowed to enter Parks and public gardens, or to visit theatres, concert-halls, museums, libraries, etc.

June '41 Jews no longer allowed to visit seaside resorts and swimming pools; liquidation of the "Co-ordination Commission", established in August'40;

July '41 Compulsory stamping of the identity-cards, belonging to Jews, with a "J"

Aug.'41 Compulsory registration and depositing on blocked accounts of capital and revenues of Jews with the firm Lippmann,Rosenthal & Co, which had in the meanwhile been transferred to German hands; maximum payment per family f.250 a month (Vererdn.148/'41).

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|---|---|
| Aug '41 | Registration and compulsory sale of real estate by the "Grundstuecks-verwaltung" in the "Hague" (Verordn. 154/'41). |
| Sept. '41 | Jewish children banned from the schools; |
| Sept. '41 | Razzias in Twente and Achterhoek; |
| Sept. '41/ Oct. '41 | General travel ban for Jews; |
| Sept'41/ Oct/41. | Jews prohibited to move to another domicile; |
| Sept'41/ Oct'41 | Jews no longer allowed to visit hotels, cafe's and restruants; |
| Oct'41 | Non-Jewish firms urged to dismiss their Jewish staff; in case of dismissal it was made possible to pay one lump sum in lieu of a pension (Vererdn. 198/'41); |
| Sept/ Oct'41 | Liquidation of Jewish institutions etc. by the "Commissaris voor Vereenigingen en stichtingen zonder Economisch doel" (Commissioner for Associations and Foundations without an economic object). H.W. Muller-Lehning); depositing of their capital with H.Albert de Bary & Co., Ltd. |
| Oct'41 | Jews no longer allowed to be members of general "Associations and Foundations without an economic object" (Vererdn. 199/'41); |
| Oct'41 | Jews no longer allowed to have non-Jewish domestic staff; |
| Nov'41 | Jews removed from theatre companies, orchestras, etc. (Vererdn. 211/'41); |
| Jan/Apr'42 | Thousands of Jews sent to Netherlands Labour Camps, of which especially the camp at Ellecom was notorious for the ill-treatment of its inmates. Age originally between 18 and 35, afterwards 18 and 55; |
| March'42 | "Purging" of the province of Noord-Holland and of parts af Zuid-Holland and Zealand of Jews; concentration of Jews in three districts of Amsterdam |
| May'42 | Tightening up of the regulations concerning the depositing of capital and revenues with Lippmann, Rosenthal & Co; compulsory handing in of gold, silver, jewels, objects of art. etc, (Vererdn. 58/'42); |
| May'42 | Compulsory wearing of the Yellow Badge; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to be in the street between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m.; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to visit non-Jewish shops except between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to buy fruit and fish; compelled to buy food in Jewish shops only (concerns Amsterdam) |
| May'42 | Jews forbidden to be in para-medical and a number of other professions; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to use public conveyances; Jews with "travel permits" must travel in third class smoking compartments in trains; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to use bicycles, all bicycles must be handed in; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to use the telephone; |
| May'42 | Jews no longer allowed to enter the houses of non-jews; |
| July'42 | Completion of the "aryanisation" or liquidation of Jewish firms; decision to intern the Jews gradually in Westerbork to be deported from there to Poland; |
| July/ Sept'42 | Razzias → Jews taken from their houses, assembled at the Zentralstelle fuer |

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Contd.-

Juedische Auswanderung, transported to Westerbork; Their household belongings seized;

Oct'42 New large scale razzias - all Jews from labour camps transferred to Westerbork;

Since Nov.'42 Jews taken from their houses, from now on assembled in the so-called "Hewish Theatre" in Amsterdam, from where they were sent to Westerbork; after a few days;

April'43 Jews living outside Amsterdam sent to the camp at Vught - a labour camp for the German Army,- and eventually transported to Westerbork;

Sept'43 Last Jews from Amsterdam including the leaders of the Jewish Council, sent to Westerbork;

The transfer to Westerbork took place gradually from the Summer of 1942 till the Autumn of 1943.

Postponement, and sometimes waiving of interment could be obtained through a so-called"Sperr" stamp on the identity-card. These were given principally to persons of "mixed" marriage, whose children had been born before October '42; to baptized Jews, to persons employed by the Jewish Council, to Jews working in Factories etc, for the German Army, including diamond workers, and moreover to those figuring on the Carlmeyer, Frederiks-or van Dam list.

The Carlmeyer list, compiled by a German official, contained the names of Portuguese Jews and of others who thought that they were wrongly considered as Jews.

The lists Frederiks and Van Dam, compiled by the Secretary General of the Netherlands Home Office respectively, the Ministry of Education and "Protection of Culture", contained the names of those who had deserved well of the Netherkands, including the members of their family, totalling about 500 persons. Originally they were housed near Barneveld and received the assurance that they would not be deported. Afterwards they were nevertheless transferred to Westerbork, and it seems that they were dpported to Theresienstadt, presumably.

## 2. Westerbork.

In Westerbork -of which we need not give a description here - 12.000 to 15.000 persons used to live at the same time; they were housed in huts, which were adjusted for the purpose, and each of which contained about 800 persons.

All Jewish Netherlanders, whom the Germans could lay their hands on- with the exception of a small group of exempted persons- were brought together here; hospitals, old age homes, institutions fot the blind and other disabled persons were emptied in order to concentrate the inmates in Westbork for deportation. Even the inmates of lunatic asylums did not escape deportation.

Gradually all those interned in Westerbork were deported to Poland-old people and babies included ! "Zum Aebeitseinsatz unter polizeiliche Bewachung".

Once or twice a week a train "Westerbork-Auschwitz" left with 1200 to 2.000 persons. Originally these trains were composed of passenger cars, afterwards only goods vans,(first with and afterwards without straw) in each of which about 60 deportees used to be transported. Even sick people were loaded into goods vans, Every deportee was allowed to take maximum 15 kilograms of luggage with him. The choice of those to be deported was more or less arbitrary; some were able to get their deportation temporarily postponed by means of so-called "Sperr" stamps. In the Autumn of 1943, all those who had been interned at Vught - a number of about 1.200 - were deported to Poland - with the exception of diamond workers and those employed at Philips (Het Parool, 15/12/43).

The above enumeration shows clearly the gradual character of the measures of the enemy, some of which may seem of little importance. The Dutch Jews were deprived of their livelihood, their property and possessions were confiscated, every freedom of movement was taken from them, they were isolated from their fellow-citizens, and finally, as a group without any rights, humiliated and extruded, they were deported, condemned to slave labour and as it is to be feared partly killed.

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## After Deportation.

It is almost impossible to get details about the individual fate of Dutch Jews deported to Poland.

45810

Contd.-

After their leaving Holland all trace of them was lost. Absorbed in an agglomeration of deportees from almost all occupied countries, they can no longer be identified as a seperate group

## DEPORTATION OF JEWISH NETHERLANDERS.
## Statistical and othet details.

### 1. THE NETHERLANDS.

a) Number of Jewish deportees.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Registered as Jews in January 1941; Netherlands subjects; | | 138.000 |
| Non-Netherlands subjects: | | 22.000 |
| Total number of those registered : | | 160.000 |
| of whom "half" and "quater" Jews | | 20.000 |
| Full" Jews, being liable to deportation | | 140.000 |
| to be deducted: | | |
| those who fled or imigrated | 4500 | |
| those who were killed or committed suicide | 2000 | |
| still in the Netherlands | | |
| Jews of "mixed" Marriage : | 7500 | |
| exchange list ) | | |
| Portuguese Jews ) | 4000 | |
| working in the "Wehrmacht industry, | | |
| "Special" cases, | | |
| in hiding. ) | 7000 | |
| | 18500 | |
| | | 25.000 |
| Deported from the Netherlands 1) | | 115.000 |
| Deported from France and Belgium 2) | | 2.000 |
| Total number of deportees | | 117.000 |

Distribution

To Poland : Netherlands subjects: 100.000, non-Netherlands subjects 15.000.= 115.000
To Terezin: " " " 1.000, " " " " 1.000.= 2.000

With reference to further deportations still to be expected, and estimated at about 3.000 persons, a sum total may be reached of about 120.000 Jewish deportees.

The above numbers are only approximative.

1) Netherlands and non- Netherlands subjects
2) Netherlands subjects only,

b) Names of the Deportees.

Details were registered - and may be found - with
1) the "Registratie" department in Westerbork,
2) the Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswandering (Aus der Fuente) in Amsterdam.

c) Moreover (in a clandestine way) with the Jewish Council in Amsterdam.

Moreover the local registers of the population as well as the Central Register of Population in The Hague are in the possession of the names of the persons whose identity cards were stamped with a "J" - the majority of whom were deported.

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B 45811

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APPENDIX 2.

a) Organisations in the Netherlands which were connected with the various anti-Jewish measures;

1) the Jewish Council, Compelled to be an instrument of the Germans for the carrying out of their antisemtic measures.

2) the firm Lippmann Rosenthal & Co., seemingly a Jewish banking concern, in reality a German instrument for the confiscation of Jewish capital and revenues.

3) the "Generalkommissar fuer das Sicherheitswesen "(Hoeherer S.S. und Polizeifuehrer H.Rauter, General der Polizei,), who issued many of the above-mentioned "Anordnungen."

4) the "Zentralstelle fuer Juedische Auswanderung " Leeder Aus der Funte") under the "Generalkommissar" mentioned sub 3)., seemingly an organisation for Jewish emigragration - in reality a body to deprive the Jews of their rights, segregate them and deport them.

5) the "Wirtschaftspruefstelle"( working in cooperation with the "Deutsche Treuhand" A.G.) a body for the aryanisation or liquidation of Jewish firms.

6) the "Grundstuecksverwaltung", a body for the consfication of Jewish real estates.

7) the "Commissaris voor Vereenigingen en Stichtingen zonder Economisch Doel" (H.W.Muller-Lehning), who carried out the liquidation of Jewish associations and institutions.

8) the firm H.Albert de Bary Co., the bank where the capital of the above mentioned associations were deposited.

d) Economical data.

The following may be mentioned with a certain reserve:

The "Frankfurter Zeitung" of 9th June 1942 estimates that the total number of Jewish firms etc. in the Netherlands was 21.000; 11.000 of these had to be aryanised and 10.000 liquidated.

The same paper estimates the value of the firms which were "aryanised" at fl. 150.000.000., that of consficated Jewish real estate at fl. 200.000.000., and the total of all Jewish property seized in the Netherlands at fl. 500.000.000.

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London 30 th March 1944.

w. s.H.Dentz.

B 45812

TRANSLATION.

REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT BUREAU FOR FOOD DISTRIBUTION.

CONCERNING THE FAMINE OF 1944-1945.

Since the early summer of 1944, rules have been in force by order of the German civil authorities, apparently for military reasons, with regard to landings, amongst other places, on the Dutch coast, which reduced the food stocks for the West of the country, i.e. North and South Holland and part of Utrecht, to a consumption of two to three weeks. Taking into account, amongst other reasons, the ever increasing transport difficulties of all kinds, the alimentary position of this part of the country had become extremely precarious.

Nearly one half of the population of the Netherlands, living for the greater part in the towns (the five largest towns are situated in the West) was dependant on the agricultural districts, the majority of which are situated outside the Western part.

Under these circumstances the well-known embargo was ordered by the "Reichskommissar" as a prompt reaction to the general railway strike at the beginning of September. This embargo was continued for several months, in spite of the persistent negotiations where it was repeatedly pointed out the very grave risks for the alimentation of the Western parts, entailed in the coming winter.

Not before the 8th November was the ban for food supplies to the Western parts officially lifted.

After that date, and apart from relatively unimportant measures, no conscious German opposition could be shown against the measures taken by the Netherlands administration regarding food supplies for the Western parts.

Exactly at the time, however, when the Central inland shipping organisation, formed for this purpose, started to function, frost interfered and demobilised supplies to, and stock accumulation in the Western parts; it was too late.

Not before the middle of March could a supply of any importance be obtained, for instance, an average of 10,000 tons of potatoes a week, whilst 6,000 to 6,500 were needed to supply the population with only one K.G.

Soon afterwards, however, the military operations in the North and East stopped these supplies completely until the total liberation of the country.

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B 45813

This situation, brought about by the German measures, gave rise to very serious disturbances of the public health. The mortality rate in the towns of Amsterdam (800,000 inhabitants), Rotterdam (600,000 inhabitants), The Hague (500,000 inhabitants), Leiden(80,000 inhabitants) Delft (57,000 inhabitants), Gouda (35,000 inhabitants), was as follows:

January 1945 : 3563. January 1944: 1897. increase 198%

February 1945: 5203 February 1944: 2032. increase 260%

In particular, the infant mortality has been so high in the first half of 1945 that one has to go back 30 years to find equally high figures. The principal cause is the undernourishment in the Western part.

Syndromes occur, which were hardly ever seen in these districts before 10 May 1940.

In Appendix 2 a survey is given of the composing parts of the rations in the Western part of the Netherlands during the winter 1944 - 1945 ("Voeding" 15th August 1945).

Last winter the rations provided so few calories that their number was even far below the basic metabolism.

During the occupation, until August 1944, the rations remained nearly the same, the calories for those who did not perform heavy work amounting to 1,800, which constitutes a deficit of 25% of the number required for medium work. The number of calories decreased in April 1945 to 400, but rose again during the next month, thanks to the Red Cross distribution (see Appendix 3).

This very serious food shortage forced the population of the towns to seek food in the agricultural provinces. Even the roads to the Eastern parts were crowded during the winter with people using the most primitive means of transport.

The enclosed photographs give an impression of these pitiful scenes.

B45814

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CENTRAL BUREAU FOR STATISTICS.

The deportation of Netherlands workmen to Germany.

The deportation of Netherlands workmen to foreign countries started 20th June 1940, about five weeks after the occupation of our country. The Germans used the Employment Exchanges, which were for this purpose on their orders reorganised and centralised with a Government Labour Office as a central organ and a number of local labour offices. In the beginning only unemployed were deported, who were threatened that their dole would be withheld if they refused employment. The number of unemployed who could be used, decreased gradually, even more so as the deportation was limited to persons under 40 years of age. Therefore measures were taken in 1942 to deport also idlers and employed workmen as well. With regard to the first category, an obligation to report was issued, whereby men and women between 18 and 40 years who could not, or not completely, support themselves, were ordered to register, as if in search of work, at a labour office.

To counteract dodging as much as possible, it was stipulated that business concerns needed permission from a labour office for engaging employees younger than 40 years; this permission was practically only granted for workmen who were rejected unfit for deportation. To prevent business concerns having more workmen engaged than necessary, it was also laid down that for shortening the working hours under 48 hours a week, permission from the labour office would be necessary.

According to information of the labour-offices, the reporting duty was not a success. Only a few registered at these offices.

The enlistment of working labourers took quite a different course.

Many big and reasonably large business concerns, especially in the mental industry, were visited by German commissions who appointed workmen for deportation. This combing out of the concerns was called the "Sauckel-action", so named after its leader, who was charged with the appointment of foreign workmen in Germany.

The employers had to cancel the contracts with the appointed workmen temporarily, and the latter were forced to register at the labour offices, which then took care of the deportation under supervision of German "Fachberater".

B 45815

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Workmen who refused (relatively few) were prosecuted by the "Sicherheitsdienst". If captured by this service, they were mostly lodged for some time in one of the infamous prisoners camps in the Netherlands and eventually put to work in Germany.

In this prosecution the "Sicherheitsdienst" was supported by the German Police Service, which was connected with the labour offices, and was composed of members of the N.S.B. and the like.

At the end of April 1942 the deportation of working labourers started on a grand scale. Consequently in the months of May and June the number of deportees amounted to not less than 22,000, resp.24,000, of which many were metal workers.

After that the action slackened somewhat, but in October 1942 another top was reached (2,600). After the big concerns the smaller ones had in their turn, to give up their personnel.

Later it came to closing down a number of concerns which were not considered essential for the war or for the economic life. The personnel which could be used was put to work in Germany or in enterprises in the Netherlands, which were essential for the war. Also, an action for deportation of civil servants was organised. This, however, was not very successful, in the first place because of the passive resistance of the heads of many services in supplying information about their personnel, and secondly because many public services, which wer also essential for the Germans, were in danger of being understaffed.

New extensive measures followed in the spring of 1943. All men between 18 and 35 were forced to register for the "arbeidsinzet" (war effort) a nice word for deportation, as soon as they would be called up by the labour offices for that purpose. Successively those who were born in 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1920 were called up to register, after which those born in 1922, 1923 and 1924 were called upon to report for the "arbeidsinzet". Employers were forbidden to have in their service male persons born in the years mentioned, without permission of a labour office. Although many did not report and went "underground" in June and July 1943 (top months), not less than 65,000 Netherlanders were deported to Germany, amongst which 41,000 younger than 21 years.

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B45816

The agriculture, which had been spared because of its importance for the food-supply, was this time severely affected. No less than 13,000 men had to be given up by this branch in June and July, mostly those born in 1922 to 1924.

In May 1943 a number of students were also deported, who had refused to sign the so called "loyalty statement" for undergraduates of the Universities. At the same time it was decided to recapture the members of the Netherlands forces. The proclamation of this measure gave rise to protest strikes in many private enterprises and public services and factories, whereupon many victims fell by the German revenge.

Apart from that the measure was not very successful. It seems that certain German authorities resisted its execution, because many ex-members of the forces got exemption. Others went underground.

In the second half of 1943 the Germans invented a new method to secure man-power, the so-called "Z-ticket" action started. The employers had to hand in "Z-tickets" for all the persons employed by them between the ages of 18 and 45, on which had to be stated to what extent these employees were essential for the continuation of the industry. If these tickets were not handed in within the fixed time, the business would be closed and employer and employees deported. This action had no result. So many fake tickets were applied for by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry (the industrial and other business organisations (vakgroepen) had bluntly refused), and handed in to the appointed central German bureau, that it became impossible to single out the right statements from the false ones.

It is true that the labour offices were introduced in the scheme for sorting out and checking up the tickets, but these were just the same faced with an inextricable puzzle, whereas moreover the civil servants of the offices prevented the ordering of the tickets by sabotage.

The result was that in the last month of 1943 and the greater part of 1944, relatively few were deported.

This changed in November 1944. The Germans then started a ruthless campaign for man-power, passing by the labour offices. Without warning, they lined off whole quarters of the towns, seized people in the streets or in the houses and deported them.

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B45817

In Rotterdam and Schiedam where these raids (razzia's) took place on 10 and 11 November, the amount of people thus deported was estimated at 50,000, and 5,000 respectively.

In other places where the raids were held later, the numbers were much lower, because one was forwarned by the events. The exact figures are not known as they have never been published by the occupants.

The people thus seized were put to work partly in the Netherlands, partly in Germany. A great number returned home later, either secretly (and then often assisted by the underground movement), or with permission of the Germans in connection with their indispensability for the food distribution or for other important industries or services. (In these raids even police personnel had not been spared).

In a later "proclamation" published round about X-mas 1944, it was announced from the German side that the raids were meant not only for the "manpower mobilisation" but also to prevent the civil population joining in battle actions as had happened in France and Belgium. In this "proclamation" all male persons from 16 to 39 years included, were called up to report for the manpower mobilisation in the beginning of January 1945. Good wages and good care were promised. Refusal to answer the call-up would be severely punished. Nevertheless only a few reported, amongst whom a part were driven by hunger. However, figures are not available, because the Germans did not publish those. Many people below 40 had their birthdate on their identification card and other papers changed, to evade the order.

In many cases these falsifications were taken care of by the civil servants of the Register Offices.

The events of the war then took such a turn that further deportations did not take place. But still in the North and East of the country, many men, up to 60 years, were seized and forced to build defense works in the neighbourhood of their homes. Such "requisition", for which a decree for civil conscription had been issued in 1941, had taken place in former years already on a large scale in the Western part of the country.

Attached are two schedules, one of which gives a survey of the deportation in the different years, the other of the deported workman of the different trades.

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B 45818

**Schedule 1.** Deportation of Netherlands workmen to foreign countries:

20th June 1940 - 31st July 1944 included.

| | 1940 | 1941 | 1942 | 1943 | Jan - July'44 2) | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany: deported | 99,600 | 99,900 | 162,800 | 148,900 | 20,000 | 531,300 |
| returned | 6,900 | 42,400 | 50,700 | 30,100 | 13,200 | 143,300 |
| employed | 92,700 | 57,500 | 112,100 | 118,800 | 6,800 | 388,000 |
| Other countries deported (1) | - | 32,100 | 8,300 | 2,900 | 200 | 43,500 |
| Total | 92,700 | 89,600 | 120,400 | 121,700 | 7,000 | 431,500 |

1) Mainly to France and for the major part workmen of the building trade. The amount of returned workmen is not available.

2) The requisitioned people by raids in November 1944 and the people who reported for the "manpower-mobilisation" in January 1945 (no figures available) excluded.

**Schedule 2.** Deportees to foreign countries in the different trades.

| Principal trades. | Employed in 1940 | Employed in foreign countries 1st August 1944 (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Absolute figures 4) | Percentages from column 2. |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Industries | 1,171,300 | 315,500 | 26,9 |
| i.e. ceramics | 55,100 | 6,100 | 11,1 |
| building trade | 283,000 | 96,300 | 34,0 |
| timber | 47,900 | 7,000 | 14,6 |
| clothing | 86,100 | 5,900 | 6,9 |
| leather | 45,600 2) | 4,800 | 11,0 |
| mines | 44,200 | 9,500 | 21,5 |
| metal | 198,000 | 64,900 | 32,8 |
| textile | 97,500 | 24,600 | 25,2 |
| food and luxuries | 191,600 | 17,800 | 9,3 |
| Commerce and transport | 638,000 | 35,500 | 5,6 |
| Agriculture | 339,400 | 37,800 | 11,1 |

1) Calculated from the different types of craftsmen in a statement by the Government insurance bank, unemployed and people in the forces added.

2) In the beginning of 1942, according to a statement of the Inspector-General for mining.

3) According to the Stock-taking of agriculture and market-gardening in 1940.

4) See note 2) schedule 1.

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B 45819

These are the official figures of the labour-offices. Probably they differ considerably from reality.

Many of the deportees returned secretly or stayed behind after leave and then went underground.

At a rough estimation of some labour-offices in the beginning of 1944 about 300,000 Netherlands workmen were employed in Germany, i.e. 20% less than the official figure. This estimation concurred with one made by the Germans which was published in the "Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant" in the beginning of February 1944.

The Repatriation service estimated the number of deportees to Germany till the end of the war at 370,000 to 400,000. From these, up to the beginning of August 1945, 261,200 were registered by the Netherlands Military Government, as repatriated.

About the rest no information is yet available. A great number are still in the Russian zone.

The method of transport of deportees up to September 1944 was reasonable. It is true that one had to stand in crowded trains for many hours, which resulted in infirmities for some, like swollen legs and similar complaints. After the railway strike (mid-September 1944) this changed completely. For instance, many persons seized by the raids of November 1944, had to cover the way to their destination for a considerable part (also in Germany) by foot, in spite of very bad weather, often in very bad shoes and insufficient clothing, also sleeping accommodation for these persons was insufficient (in barns and such). Other deportees again were transported in crowded Rhine-barges. The ones who reported for the man-power mobilisation in January 1945 improved in their transport, namely nearly the whole trip by railway, be it only goods wagons.

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B45820

RvT/AD

den 18. Dezember 1943.

An den
Reichskommissar für die besetzten niederländischen Gebiete,
den Herrn Dr. A. Seyss-Inquart,

's G r a v e n h a g e.

Gegenstand : Erhöhung der Beiträge, welche die Niederlande für die Kriegsführung im Osten leisten.

Hochverehrter Reichskommissar !

In Uebereinstimmung mit Ihnen und mit den Leiter der Nationalsozialistischen Bewegung in den Niederlanden wurde seit den 1. Juli 1941 ein freiwilliger Beitrag zur Kriegsführung im Osten von den Niederlanden geleistet in der Höhe von 50 Millionen Mark monatlich, wovon 10 Millionen in Gold gezahlt wurden zu lasten des Goldvorrates der Niederländischen Bank. Seit den 1. Juli 1941 wurden 192 Millionen Mark in Gold an die Reichsbank gezahlt. Die Goldvorräte der Niederländischen Bank sind seit März 1943 erschöpft. Seitden werden die Zahlungen gänzlich aus den Markenguthaben der Niederländischen Bank abgebucht.

Herr Minister Fischböck hat mich vor einigen Wochen gebeten die finanzielle und wirtschaftliche Lage der Niederlande auf die Möglichkeit prüfen zu wollen, den Beitrag für den Osten zu verdoppeln, also monatlich auf 100 Millionen Mark zu erhöhen.

Minister Fischböck hat in seiner Begründung auf die erhöhten Kosten der Kriegsführung hingewiesen, welche das Reich gegen den Bolschewismus und Amerikanismus zu tragen hat. Es ist uns auch vollkommen klar, Herr Reichskommissar, dass die unmenschlichen Bombangriffe auf deutsche Städte nicht nur seelich das deutsche Volk aufs Schwerste belasten, sondern dass die materiellen Schäden enorme Ausgaben verursachen.

Herr Minister Fischböck war der Meinung, dass eine Erhöhung der monatlichen Zuwendungen für Besatzungskosten un 20 Millionen Gulden, also von 100 Millionen auf 120 Millionen monatlich wohl unvermeidlich wäre. Die jetzigen Leistungen der Niederlande für Besatzungskosten (1200 Millionen Gulden) und Beiträge für den Osten (450 Millionen Gulden) würden sich daher von 1650 Millionen Gulden auf 2340 Millionen Gulden jährlich erhöhen, wenn die Vorschläge von Minister Fischböck durchzuführen wären.

Die Finanzierung dieser erhöhten Beiträge sei nach der Meinung des Herrn Minister Fischböck durch die grosse Liquidität des Geldmarktes ermöglicht.

In diesen Zusammenhang möchte ich erwähnen, dass die Guthaben der Banken bei der Niederländischen Bank, von den Minimum von 141 Millionen Gulden am Ende des Jahres 1942, bis auf 650 Millionen Gulden am 18. Oktober angestiegen sind. Da dieses letzte Argument in den Vordergrund gestellt wurde, möchte ich die Ursachen dieser scheinbaren Liquidität hier näher untersuchen.

Als am 1. April 1941 die Devisengrenze und am 1. September 1941 praktisch die letzten Hindernisse des freien Kapitalverkehrs zwischen dem Reich und den Niederlanden wegfielen und die Absicht vorlag den Zahlungsverkehr zwischen den Niederlanden und dritten Ländern in zunehmenden Ausmass im Rahmen des multilateralen Clearings über Berlin abzuwickeln, wodurch es den Niederlanden möglich sein würde, ihr Reichsmarksaldo zur Abdeckung ihrer Zahlungsverpflichtungen gegenüber dritten Ländern zu verwenden, wurden diese Massnahmen von denjenigen meiner Landleute besonders begrüsst, welche darin einen ersten Schritt zur grösseren Raumbildung zwischen den germanischen Völkern und darüber hinaus der europäischen Wirtschaft ersahen. Dieser erste Durchbrauch zu einer europäischen Freiwirtschaft konnte jedoch nur Erfolg haben, wenn denselben innerhalb kürzester Frist von ähnlichen Massnahmen zwischen dem Reich und andern Ländern gefolgt wurde und sodann auch die Schranken zwischen den Niederlanden und den betreffenden Staaten beseitigt würden. Sollte letzteres nicht der Fall sein, so wäre die Wirtschaft des Reiches allen europäischen Staaten, also auch den germanischen Randstaaten gegenüber, in eine Vorzugsstellung gestellt. Dies würde den Prinzip der germanischen Gleichberechtigung zuwiderlaufen.

Leiden . . .

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B 45821

Leider muss hier festgestellt werden, dass dem Beispiel, dass die Niederlande in dieser hinsicht gegeben haben, von den anderen Staaten Europas Nicht gefolgt wurde und das im Gegenteil versucht worden ist, den freien Güter-, Geld- und Kapitalverkehr zwischen den Niederlanden mit den Reich durch Massnahmen zu erschweren, welche dem gesetzten Ziel der Bildung einer Grossraumwirtschaft nicht nur zuwiderliefen, sondern auch die Niederlande schwer trafen, da der freie Zahlungsverkehr zwischen dem Reich und den Niederlanden einerseits ausgenutzt wurde um Markenguthaben, welche andere Staaten hatten auf die Niederlande abzuwälzen, andererseits die Niederlande nicht in demselben Ausmass die Möglichkeit erhielten, das ingefolge der Aufhebung der Devisengrenze selbstverständlich angestiegene Reichsmarkenguthaben über das multilaterale Clearing zur Abdeckung ihrer Verpflichtungen dem Ausland gegenüber zu verwenden. Mehrere Länder, mit denen der Zahlungsverkehr ganz oder teilweide über das Zentralclearing abgewickelt wird, halten nichtdestoweniger an dem bilateralen Clearingsgedanken fest und nehmen denselben zum Leitfaden ihrer Verrechnungspolitiek. Insofern diese Versuche Erfolg gehabt haben, haben sie dazu beigetragen die Markenforderung der Niederlande erheblich zu steigern. Wenn diesen Verstössen anderer Staaten kein Einhalt geboten wird, ist zu befürchten, dass dadurch die niederländischen Markenguthaben sich ins Uferlose steigern werden. Dazu treten in allerletzten Zeit Erscheinungen, welche auf eine Abwanderung gewisser Interessenten aus der Mark und nach den Gulden schliessen lassen.

Ich möchte nun noch ein Beispiel erwähnen, wo die Abneigung gegen die Mark sich direkt gegen den mit ihr in einer festen Relation verbundenen Gulden auswirkte, nähmlich das Uebereinkommen, welches in Abwesenheit von Niederländischen Vertretern, jedoch unter Zuziehung von belgischen Vertretern der Notenbank, in den Besprechungen vom 13. bis 15. September dieses Jahres über den niederländischen-belgischen Zahlungsverkehr getroffen wurde. Ich werde dieses Uebereinkommen, welches den Gegenstand von Besprechungen mit Ihren Beauftragten bei der Niederländischen Bank bildete und welches wir dann zusammen mit dem Vizepraesidenten der Reichsbank, Herrn Puhl besprachen, nicht eingehend erörtern, sondern nur darauf hinweisen, dass der belgischen Staat, welche in unzulässiger Weise die Besatzung ausgenützt hatte um ihre Zinsen- und Amortisationszahlungen an die Niederlande seit 1940 einzustellen, in dem genannten Uebereinkommen den Versuch gemacht hat, diese Rückstände und die gesammte Kapitalschuld an den Niederlanden mit ihren Markenguthaben abzutragen. Demgegenüber ist die Belgische Nationalbank nur bereit in bestimmten Fällen (Reisende und Grenzverkehrer) Gulden zu kaufen, indem sie auch nicht gewillt ist diese Guldenkäufe (bis jetzt ungefähr 20 Millionen Gulden) im Clearingswege zu verrechnen, sondern diese Guldenguthaben als eine Forderung auf die Niederlande betrachtet, welche in Devisen beglichen werden muss.

Diese Haltung muss als eine direkte Untergrabung der Vertrauens-des in der Deutschen Währung und in der mit dieser verbundenen holländischen Währung karakterisiert werden. Das Angebot holländischer Gulden an die belgische Notenbank wurde ausgelöst durch eine Verknappung unserer belgischen Guthaben, welche eben verursacht wurde durch die seit 1940 belgischer-seits erfolgte Weigerung, den Dienst ihrer holländischer Schulden aufrechtzuerhalten. So wurde künstlich eine ungünstige Entwicklung des niederländisch-belgischen Clearings hervorgerufen.

Diese Beispiele einer gegen die Mark und daher gegen den Gulden gerichteten Abwehr stehen nicht vereinzelt da, sondern ähnliche Erfahrungen sind auch mit der Französischen Notenbank gemacht worden, während auch gewisse Uebereinkommen mit der Türkei und mit Ungarn die Abwälzung von Markenguthaben dieser Länder auf die Niederlande zufolge hatten. In anderen Clearingsverträgen (Polen) ist darüber hinaus die Kapitalsueberweisung nur nach den Niederlanden ermöglicht, indem Kapitalsueberweisung in gegengesetzter Richtung nicht erlaubt ist.

Da nach Aufhebung der Devisengrenze das niederländische und deutsche Devisenregime in einem zahlungstechnisch freien Raum schwebt, hat die Praxis erwiesen, dass der Druck aus dem Ausland sich auf die Stelle, welche die Niederlande mit ihrem jungen Devisenregime einnehmen, richtet, wodurch es dem Ausland möglich ist, über die Niederlande zu erreichen, was das deutsche Devisenregime verhindert.

Neben . . .

H4315 – 0049

8 45822

Neben diesen Erscheinungen sind auch die wachsenden Zuflüsse von Markenbanknoten zu erwähnen, welche von einem Durchschnitt von 1 Million Reichsmark pro Tag im Monat April 1941, auf 2,5 bis 3 Millionen seit November 1942 und auf 3,6 Millionen pro Tag in September 1943 angestiegen sind und deren Herkunft, trotz aller Anstrengungen der Niederländischen Bank, bis jetzt nicht geklärt werden konnte. Es ist zumindest auffallend, dass trotz des freien Zahlungsverkehrs zwischen den Niederlanden und dem Reich, derartige Beträge in Markennoten bei der Niederländischen Bank einfliessen und es liegt die Vermutung auf der Hand, dass es sich hier, wenigstens zum Teil, um Markenbestände handelt, welche aus Deutschland und aus gewissen Nachbarländern in den niederländischen Raum abgeschoben und in Gulden umgesetzt werden. Es ist mir bekannt, dass in einigen Fällen vom niederländischen Preiskommissar grosse Schwarzankäufe seitens deutscher Industriellen beschlagnahmt wurden, sodass die Annahme gerechtfertigt erschiene, dass die Markenzuflüsse auf solche Schwarzankäufe zum Teil zurückführen sind.

Mit anderen Worten, es muss angenommen werden, dass die schon vorher erwähnte Abwanderung aus der Mark in den Gulden sich steigert und dass dadurch die Idee der Raumbildung, welche die Beseitigung der Zoll- und Devisengrenzen zwischen den Niederlanden und Deutschland bedingt hatte, gefährdet ist. Dieser gewaltige und immer wachsende Strom von Markenbanknoten und die bankmässigen Ueberweisungen von Reichsmarkenguthaben an die Niederländische Bank haben die Markenguthaben der Bank von 83 Millionen an Ende des Monats März 1941 auf 3646 Millionen am Ende des Monats September 1943 gesteigert.

Ich möchte hier noch ausdrücklich betonen, dass seinerzeit die Aufhebung der Devisengrenze durchgeführt wurde in der Idee, dass der Krieg nicht von langer Dauer sein würde. Wäre der Friedensaufbau Europas bald nach der Deutsch-niederländischen Raumbildung erfolgt, so hätte die Beseitigung der Zoll- und Devisengrenzen mit anderen Staaten auch der freien Entwicklung der niederländischen Wirtschaft genützt. Jetzt wirkt der Druck auf die Reichsmark, welcher durch die Politik anderer europäischen STAATEN ausgelöst wird, sich in steigendem Masse in ungünstigem Sinne für die Niederlande aus. Wenn ich erwähne, dass die Untersuchung der Herkunft der Markenbestände zu keinen Schlussfolgerungen geführt hat, so liegt der Grund darin, dass jede Kontrolle niederländischerseits unmöglich geworden ist, weil infolge der Aufhebung der Devisengrenze die Kontrolle des bilateralen Zahlungsverkehrs aufgehoben ist und wir keinen Einblick in das Zentralclearing Berlin haben.

Ich möchte in diesem Zusammenhang darauf hinweisen, dass die Verhandlungen über den deutsch-belgischen Verkehr oder über den Verkehr zwischen Belgien und dritten Ländern, zumindest unter Beteiligung der betreffenden belgischen Behörden stattfinden, während ähnliche Verhandlungen die Niederlande betreffend ohne unsere Beteiligung geführt und abgeschlossen worden sind. So ist es uns zwar möglich, die qualitativen Ursachen des immer schnelleren Anwachsens der Markenguthaben festzustellen, es ist uns aber unmöglich die quantitative Wertung dieser Ursachen vorzunehmen. Als qualitative Ursachen des immer schnelleren an wachsenden Marken-guthabens der Niederländischen Bank könnte man folgendes erwähnen:

1. Güterankäufe in den Niederlanden. Diese wirken sich in zwei Hinsichten nachteilig für uns aus. Infolge der Aufhebung der Devisen- und Zollgrenze werden hier erstens für deutsche Rechnung Güter gekauft, welche die Niederlande im Rahmen der Clearingkontingente oder in Devisen aus dem Ausland bezogen haben, zweitens hier zu Lande Güter gekauft, welche Deutschland nach dritten Ländern exportiert. Beides hat einen Devisenverlust und ein Anwachsen von Reichsmarkenguthaben für die Niederlande zur Folge.

2. Effektenankäufe in den Niederlanden.

3. Lohnueberweisungen der 400.000 in Deutschland eingesetzten Arbeiter aus den Niederlanden.

4. Die Lieferung niederländischer Betriebe infolge der Auftragsverlagerung eines Teiles der deutschen Kriegsprodukten.

5 . . .

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5. Schuldenrückzahlungen an die Niederlande in Marken, sowie Zahlungen von Zinsen und Amortisationen der niederländischen Auslandsforderungen in Marken.

Wie Ihnen bekannt sein dürfte, bestand vor dem 1. September 1939 eine ziemlich beträchtliche Verschuldung Deutschlands an die Niederlande. Diese Verschuldung ist zum Teile abgelöst worden und zwar in Marken. Daneben wurde dem Ausland die Möglichkeit geschaffen, langfristige Kredite sowie kurzfristige Handelsschulden unter Heranziehung von Clearing- oder Sperrmarken den Niederlanden zurückzubezahlen. In dieser Weise kauften Dänemark, Ungarn und Frankreich hier zu Lande mit Zahlung im Clearingwege Schuldverschreibungen zurück, indem der Türkei erlaubt wurde, zu diesem Zwecke Sperrmarkenguthaben zu verwenden. Auch die Ueberweisung von ausländischen Markenguthaben zur Abdeckung niederländischen Forderungen anderer Art kommt wiederholt vor. Das Ausfallen der Ueberwachung niederländischerseits ermöglicht obendrein die Ueberweisung für Rechnung des Auslandes von Beträgen nach den Niederlanden, wobei die Niederlande nur formell Gläubiger sind (Auswandersperrmarkenkredite; Banken welche als Vermittler beim Plazieren von Geldern in Deutschland und in den besetzten Gebieten auftraten).

Diese Erscheinungen bedeuten also eine Abwälzung der schwebende Kaufkraft zu lasten der Niederlande, welche infolge der Aufhebung der Devisengrenze am 1. April 1941 von unseren Behörden nur nachträglich und auch dann nur teilweise kontrolliert werden konnte.

Infolge dieser Entwicklung steigt unser mit Gulden finanziertes Markenguthaben immer schneller an. Demzufolge ensteht in den Niederlanden eine künstliche Liquidität und die Forderung eines erhöhten Beitrages für die Kriegskosten im Osten hat daher den Anschein technisch durchführbar zu sein.

Mit allem Nachdruck muss hier aber festgestellt werden, dass die jetzige Situation für die Niederlande immer unhaltbar wird und dass nur eines von zwei Mitteln uns aus der Sackgasse, in der wir geraten sind, hinausführen könnte, nämlich die baldmöglichst durchzuführende Aufhebung der Devisengrenze zwischen dem Reich und seinen Nachbarstaaten, allenfalls zwischen dem Reich und den besetzten Gebieten, oder eine Wiedereinführung der deutschen-niederländische Devisengrenze. Letztere Lösung würde einen Rückschritt bedeuten, sie fällt also fort. Ich möchte hier versichern, das unsererseits angestrebt wird bis zur Grenze der niederländischen Leistungsfähigkeit freiwillig die Kosten der schicksalsschweren Kriegsführung des Reiches mitzutragen. Es ist jedoch dem niederländischen Volke gegenüber nicht vertretbar auf Grund unserer loyalen Haltung anderen Staaten die Gelegenheit zu geben, unsere Opferfreudigkeit zu missbrauchen, denn es würde sich für die Niederlande eine verhaltnismässige viel schwerere Belastung ergeben. Auch eine dauernde Benachteiligung der Niederlande nach dem Krieg würde die Folge sein. Die Kapitalverluste der Niederlande würden unverhältnismassig höher sein als die von Staaten wie Belgien und eine Erholung unserer Heimat von den schweren Kriegsschäden würde sich unverhältnismassig schwieriger gestalten als die der Nachbarstaaten.

Ich möchte diese Auffführungen an Hand der finanziellen Lage der Niederlande erläutern:

Die Staatsausgaben der Niederlande stiegen von 1.051 Millionen Gulden im Jahre 1939 bis zu 3.875 Millionen im Jahre 1943. Dieser Betrag wird sich im Jahre 1944 weiter erhöhen und würde durch die obenerwähnte gesteigerten Beiträge für die Kriegsführung im Osten und für die Besetzungskosten den Gesamtbetrag von rund 4.650 Millionen Gulden übersteigen. Zur Deckung dieser Beträge ständen nur rund 1,625 Millionen an Steuern und anderen Einnahmen zur Verfügung sodass die Ausgaben nur zu rund einem Drittel von den Einnahmen gedeckt wären, ein Verhältnis das weit ungünstiger ist das des Reiches. Ich möchte in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Dresdner Ausführungen des Staatssekretärs Reinhardt hinweisen, woraus sich ergibt, dass in dem Jahre 1942/43 5/9 der Ausgaben aus Einnahmen des Reiches und Kriegsbeiträgen verschiedener Länder gedeckt wurden. Es ist anzunehmen, dass dieses Verhältnis im Finanzjahr 1943/44 ungünstiger sein wird, aber auch die Niederlande stehen vor neuen schweren Ausgaben worüber ich mir erlauben werde Ihnen separat zu berichten.

Ich . . .

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Ich weiss dass behauptet wird, dass in den Niederlanden die Steuerkraft nicht in gleichen Masse herangezogen wird als in Reiche. Dieses muss ich bestreiten unter Hinweis darauf, dass eine auf internationalen Verkehr und Kolonialverwaltung ruhende Wirtschaft wie die Niederländische, selbstverständlich von diesem Weltkrieg viel schwerer getroffen wird als die des Reiches, welche überwiegend eine Binnenwirtschaft ist.

Ich komme nun zu der Frage der Deckung des Abganges von rund 3 Milliarden Gulden pro Jahr, welcher sich im Falle der obenerwähnten Erhöhungen der niederländischen Beiträge zu den Besatzungskosten und zu der Kriegsführung ergeben würde. Obwohl der Abgang des Jahres 1940 nur 714, des Jahres 1941 1.323, des Jahres 1942 1.773 und des Jahres 1943 schätzungsweise 2.224 Millionen Gulden beträgt, so würde die Deckung der durch diese Abgänge in der Periode 15.5.40 bis zum 30.9.43 hervorgerufenen Kassenbedürfnisse nur zu etwas mehr als die Hälfte durch langfristige Anleihen mit einen Gesamtertrag von 3.980 Millionen durchgeführt, während der verbliebene Rest von 2.644 Millionen durch die Erhöhung der schwebende Verschuldung finanziert wurde. Es muss aber berücksichtigt werden, dass die kassenmässigen Bedürfnisse noch viel grösser gewesen wären, wenn nicht in der Zeit von März bis inklusiv September 1943 ein Betrag von 708 Millionen Gulden an die Staatskasse überwiesen wurde, aus der Einlieferung von 100 und 500 Guldennoten, welche zwecks Erfassung der von Schwarzhändlern gehorteten Noten ausser Kraft gesetzt wurden. Zum Teil (100 Millionen) ist diese Massnahme als eine Kapitalsteuer , zum restlichen Teil als eine kurzfristige Zwangsanleihe aufzufassen, welche die Kassenbedürfnisse des Staatshaushaltes betrechtlich herabsetzte. Ansonsten wäre die schwebende Verschuldung bis Ende September 1943 noch viel stärker angewachsen. Es muss daher festgestellt werden, dass eigentlich weniger als die Hälfte der Kassenbedürfnisse bis zum 30. September aus dem Ertrag langfristiger Anleihen gedeckt wurde, obwohl die Defizite der Jahre 1940-1943 (bis September) bedeutend geringer waren als das der kommenden Zeit.

Die letzte Anleihe mit einen Ertrag von 997.5 Millionen wurde im August dieses Jahres flüssig gemacht. Sie ist von Anleihenmarkt noch nicht verdaut worden. Im Gegenteil mussten ungefähr 100 Millionen zur Stützung des Marktes verwendet werden, welche im Laufe der nächsten Monate wieder zum Verkauf gelangen müssen. Es zeigt sich daher, dass die jetzige Flüssigkeit des Geldmarktes nicht mit einer entsprechenden Aufnahmefähigkeit des Kapitalmarktes zusammengeht. Bestenfalls könnte im nächsten Jahre dasselbe Resultat erreicht werden als in den beiden letzten Jahren, und zur Auflegung einer neuen Milliardenanleihe geschritten werden, sodass mindestens zwei Milliarden des Abganges des Staatshaushaltes aus der Erhöhung der schwebenden Schuld finanziert werden müssten, falls die von Minister Fischböck vorgeschlagenen Zuschläge zu den niederländischen Kriegsbeiträgen angenommen werden. Die Abwanderung, welche offenbar aus der Mark in den Gulden stattfindet, wird aber zwangsweise nach den Sieg der deutschen Waffen zu einer Rückwanderung dieser Kapitalien führen, insoweit als es sich um Fluchtkapital handelt. Die Niederlande könnten dadurch in eine besonders schwere Lage und könnten die Kreditbedürfnisse der in Friedenszeit sich erholende Wirtschaft in viel geringerem Ausmasse befriedigen als die Nachbarstaaten, welche sich durch die Aufrechterhaltung der Devisengrenze und durch ihre reichsfeindliche Währungspolitik geschützt hatten. Aus den obigen Ausführungen geht hervor, dass die Niederlande durch die Aufhebung der Devisengrenze mit dem Reich auch kreditpolitisch den anderen Nachbarstaaten im Nachteil stehen und dass das niederländische Wirtschaftsleben bedroht ist. Da ich weiss, dass auch Sie, Herr Reichskommissar, die Erhaltung der qualitativ begabten niederländischen Wirtschaft im Interesse des Reiches für unbedingt notwendig halten, so glaube ich, dass Sie mir zustimmen werden, dass die Niederlande derartige Benachteiligungen nicht erfahren sollten.

Ich möchte ergänzend noch bemerken, dass die Steuereinnahmen sich im Jahre 1943 gesenkt haben und mit einen Ertrag von rund 1.300 Millionen (geschätzt in Oktober dieses Jahres) rund 160 Millionen niedriger sind als im Jahre 1942. Es wäre also zu erwarten, dass der langfristige Anleihemarkt sich im nächsten Jahre ungünstiger gestalten wird und dass daher auch aus diesem Grunde eine Erhöhung der Ausgaben sich kreditpolitisch höchst nachteilig auswirken würde.

Zum Schluss möchte ich darauf hinweisen, dass die allerdringendsten Massnahmen sozialpolitischer Art in den Niederlanden ungeachtet der wiederholten Besprechungen, welche diesbezüglich stattfanden, wegen der finanziellen Notlage zurückgestellt werden müssen. Es handelt sich hier z.B. um die Frage der Mindestentlohnung, welche seinerzeit von mir mit Minister Fischböck besprochen wurde und wo meine Vorschläge die volle Unterstützung des Arbeitsfrontführers, Herrn Woudenberg, des Preiskommissars, Herrn Dr. Schokker, und des Generalsekretärs im Ministerium für soziale Verwaltung, fanden. Obwohl seit-dem hunderttausende von

Arbeitern . . .

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B 45825

Arbeitern nach Deutschland gewandert sind gibt es auch jetzt noch in den Niederlanden zahllose Menschen, die eine Entlohnung bekommen, welche sogar nicht ausreicht um das "Distributionspaket" zu kaufen. Diese Notlage wurde ebenfalls hervorgerufen durch die Preisangliechung an das höhere deutsche Niveau, ohne dass die Löhne dementsprechend erhöht wurden. Das Lohnniveau ist also zurückgeblieben. Die Frage der Entlehnung der Beambten ist ein schwerwiegendes Problem, das noch einer Lösung harrt.

Es erschien mir richtig, hochverehrter Reichskommissar, Sie auf diese Umstände hinzuweisen. Kein niederländischer Nationalsozialist wird die Tatsache verkennen, dass der Bombenkrieg, welchen England und Amerika jetzt mehr als einem Jahr führen, seelisch und materiell das deutsche Volk in einem Ausmass belastet, wie die anderen Länder es sich kaum vorstellen können. Die europäische Gemeinschaft soll von einer Solidarität getragen werden, welche alle Beteiligten zum bringen von Opfern heranziehen sollte. Dazu ist auch das niederländische Volk bereit. Diesen sollte aber so verstanden werden, dass andere Staaten Europas die Bereitwilligkeit der Niederlande ausnützen, um uns ueber Gebühr zu belasten.

Als wir im März 1942 damit anfingen mit Rückwirkung bis zum 1. Juli 1941 freiwillig einen Beitrag für die Kriegsführung im Osten zu leisten, glaubten wir, dass andere europäische länder unserem Beispiel folgen würden. Dies ist, wenn meine Informationen richtig sind, nicht geschehen. Es ist unter obiger Berücksichtigung dass ich Sie bitte die von Herrn Minister Fischböck vorgeschlagenen Neuen Opfer prüfen zu wollen; eine Nochmalige Erhohung wäre daher nicht zu verantworten.

Ich grüsse Sie, hochverehrter Reichskommissar, mit

Heil Hitler !

Dr. M.M. Rost van Tonningen.

B45826

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CENTRAL BUREAU FOR STATISTICS.

The Hague.

29th August, 1945.

## 1. DESTRUCTION.

1. The Municipal Harbour Works of Rotterdam issued the following information.

| | Before 10 May 1940 | 15 June 1945. |
|---|---|---|
| Length of quays for sea-going ships with draught of more than 6 m. | 25,000 M. | 18,000 M. |
| Usable surface in sheds and warehouses | 530,000 $M^2$ | 345,000 $M^2$ |
| Bridge cranes | 28 | 2 |
| Quay cranes | 560 | 156 |
| Floating cranes | 83 | 45 |

2. The inundated area totalled a surface of 200,000 H.A. of which 20,000 H.A. are in the "Wieringermeer". The number of people affected by the latter inundation amounted to 6,200.

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## The Inundation of the Wieringermeer.

The Wieringermeer is the first of the four polders which, pursuant to the plans to enclose and drain parts of the former Zuyder Zee is to be reclaimed. These polders are :

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| The Wieringermeer | - | c. 20.000 ha |
| The North-East polder | - | c. 48.000 ha |
| The South-West polder - | - | c. 56.000 ha |
| The South East polder | - | c. 96.000 ha |
| In total | | c. 220.000 ha |

(1 ha is a metric measure equal to 2,471 acres)

The operations in the Wieringermeer, built in the years 1930 - 1942, were practically completed. The North-East polder had been drained and is now brought into cultivation. In the Wieringermeer three villages had been laid out and 512 farmsteads had been built. The number of inhabitants amounted to well over 6000. At the time of the calamity 8000 to 9000 people were living in the polder, the higher number being the result of evacuation from elsewhere, etc. A goodish number of people had gone underground there as well. The whole area was ultramodernly equipped with first class roads and canals, water-works, telephone and electricity and within a few years had developed into one of the leading Dutch agricultural districts. Many people from all over the world, greatly admired what had been accomplished here.

### First symptoms of interest in the Dike.

On February 10th 1945 the dikereeve of the Wieringermeer (a dikereeve is a superintendent of the dikes) received a telephone call. Inquiries were made about drawings of the shapes of cross sections of the dike, Den Oever - Medemblik. The reply was that these drawings were not available, whereas, as a matter of course, the immediate order was given to remove them. Further enquiries about these documents were dropped.

### Work on the Dike.

At the end of February the Germans began to tackle the dike by digging evicular pits, about 5 meters deep, both in the inner and outer slopes and in the crown. These pits were dug in two stretches of the dike. Inside these circular holes pits of brickwork were built with a diameter of 1 meter. Then the Germans spread the fairytale that the dike was to be "reinforced" to prevent an inundation as had occurred on the island of Walcheren. Till April 9th the work proceeded very slowly and not much that was important had happened. However, on April 9th or April 10th German officers appeared on the scene, ordering to speed things up. Between April 9th and April 15th the required number of pits were dug and on April 15th and April 16th the powerful bursting charge was placed. In the night of 16/17th April (at half past three in the morning) the population was informed that the dike was to be blown up on April 17th at noon. Consequently - in the most favourable circumstances - the population were given 8½ hours only to seek safety in flight, a period of time far too short for this vast area.

### Destruction of the Dike.

On April 17th 1945 at 12.15 the dike was blown up on two places. The result was a complete destruction. Shortly after the explosion but little water flowed into the polder, later on it increased rapidly. Within about 50 hours the polder was full of water, from 600 to 700 million cubic meters of water had passed through the holes, or about 200.000 cubic meters every minute. The water outside the polder was about 3.60 meters above average ground leve, that is there where the holes had been dug. Inside the polder the water rises from 0.50 meter to 5.20 meters above the level. On average the depth of the water inside the polder is about 3 meters.

### Results of the destruction.

As a result of the inundation of the Wieringermeer polder several

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buildings collapsed. They were not able to resist the dash of the waves. The three villages have already for the greater part been swept away. About 90% of the farmsteads are practically completely lost. Human lives need not be regretted. About 1% or 2% of the cattle were drowned. Many agricultural implements have been lost together with furniture, stocks of grain, sugarbeets, crops standing on the fields, etc. Generally speaking and going by pre-war values the total damage caused by the inundation of the Wieringermeerpolder must be estimaged at from 50 to 60 million guilders.

Circumstances which have led to destruction of the dike.

It is difficult to pass judgment on the fact whether the Deutsche Wehrmacht has perpetrated this act of destruction with military object in view. There were rumours that it was afraid of parachutists, as the Wieringermeer would have been extremely suitable for the purpose. The population of the district could not see any military necessity however. On the contrary the war had been decided. According to the prevailing opinion the destruction of the dike must be looked upon inane and wanton destruction. In this connection the following facts are of importance;

1. Two days before the destruction there appeared in the local paper an announcement by the burgomaster that the Ortskommandant of Alkmaar had informed him that the Deutsche Wehrmacht might be compelled to inundate the polder in case the population intended to support so-called terroristic actions. But in those days nothing happened in the polder which in some way or other might be interpreted that way. This was no objection however to inundate the polder all the same. This piece of news strongly impressed the inhabitants with the fact that the Germans were looking for a motive.

2. There was a system in the German designs as is evident from :

   a. the fact that the Germans were on the lookout for people who had gone underground, for motor cars etc. on the roads leading out of the polder. In the early afternoon of April 17th a captain of the Feldgendarmerie declared: "Vielleicht kommen die Untertaucher mal heraus" (maybe the men who are underground will turn up now). All this had evidently been included in the programme.

   b. From the fact that the supplies of diesel oil stored in the pumping station "Leemans" had been looted in the early afternoon of April 17th. These supplies amounted to 80.000 kg. (1 kg. is equivalent about 2 lbs.) Evidently the German army was in need of diesel oil, so that this theft was part of the programme.

3. From the pleasure and enjoyment the enemy took in the peoples misfortunes whilst shouting to them: "Jetzt können Sie schwimmen" (Now they can go for a swim). The soldiers also remarked that <u>now</u> the time had come for the German army to show what it could do (A comparison with the island of Walcheren). The general opinion of the population was that this deed was aroused by hatred. Hatred against the pronounced anti-German population of the Wieringermeer or rather hatred against the whole Dutch nation, which they intended to hit by destroying one of its greatest and best known achievements of this century.

Referring to a petition presented to the German delegate for the province of Noord-Holland by three Dutch surveyors of the dikes in the province, I received more than a week after the dike had been blown up the following oral message from Dr.Kiel, German delegate for the Department of Waterways and Dikes:

a. that, although urgent military reasons seemed to make their influence felt at the moment of destruction, the German Supreme Command regretted that things had come to such a pass.

b. that permission had been granted for the immediate repairs of the dike and draining of the polder. The German Army was prepared to place the necessary m materials in so far as these were not required by the military, at the disposal of the Dutch authorities.

c. that the Dutch authorities would be allowed to appeal to England for the necessary fuel through the medium of the International Red Cross. The Germans were willing to make intercession for the purpose.

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B 45829

Confirmation in writing of this bewildering message could not be obtained. It is, among other things, by no means clear, how the facts mentioned in subsection"b"could be reconciled with the fact that until the date of the general capitulation (May 5th) any approach to the holes in the dike was strictly prevented. Nor is it possible to understand how the contents of subsection "c" can be brought into logical agreement with the simultaneous looting of the diesel oil in the Leemans pumping station.

We cannot get rid of the impression that these empty gestures were meant as apologies of a kind. In any case: this message sheds a special light on the inundation of the polder. In my opinion it is clear from this message just as it is that from a statement attributed to Rechskommissar Seyss Inquart, that the inundation of the Wieringermeer was <u>not</u> decided upon by a group of local military men.

The Dikereeve of the "Wieringermeer"

Ir. A. Ovinge.

B45830

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COPY.

No. GA-3337.

October 11, 1943.

Sir,

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Netherlands Government received a communication from Her Majesty's Minister in Berne, Switzerland, that on May 25, 1943, Lieutenant J.J.D. ten Bosch, Lieutenant B.M.C. Braat and Lieutenant Thibo, officers of the Netherlands armed forces were sentenced to death by a German court in the occupied Netherlands. According to information published in the "Deutsche Zeitung in den Niederlanden" of July 30th, 1943, this sentence has been carried out.

The above mentioned officers, who had been released by the German authorities after the occupation of Holland in May 1940, were re-arrested in May 1942 and interned as prisoners of war in Stanislau (Stalag 371), together with nearly all career officers of the Netherlands Navy and Army. Approximately December 1st 1942 they were transported from Stanislau to the prison of Haren in the Netherlands and placed on trial for espionage and breach of parole. This trial resulted in their condemnation to death.

The Netherlands Government has informed the Swedish Government, which is charged with the protection of Netherlands interests, that the procedure followed by the German authorities with regard to the above-mentioned officers is in conflict with the provisions of articles 60 - 67 of the Convention relating to the treatment of Prisoners of War of 1929. The court which pronounced the verdict denied the accused the status of "military internees". However, the above-mentioned articles of the Geneva Convention expressly stipulate that prisoners of war can not be deprived of their status as such without their consent. Their status as prisoners of war entitles them to certain special privileges with regard to their prosecution. Therefore they cannot be arbitrarily released from internment in prisoners of war camps for the purpose of re-arresting them afterwards as plain civilians and subjecting them to a special trial for contraventions committed before they were made prisoners of war or re-arrested as such. The Netherlands Government has no reason whatsoever to assume that these persons, knowing their pending prosecution or even without any knowledge thereof, would voluntarily allow themselves to be transported to a prison in the Netherlands.

It follows from the foregoing that these officers were still enjoying prisoner of war status at the moment of their trial. This implies that the German authorities should have observed the articles of the Geneva Convention with respect to judicial proceedings against prisoners of war. Article 60 of the Convention specifically prescribes that the detaining power shall advise the protecting power before the opening of a judicial proceeding concerning any prisoner of war. The Swedish Government, which is protecting the Netherlands interests, has received no such communication.

The Netherlands Government has directed me to bring this new violation of the Geneva Convention relating to the treatment of prisoners of war by Germany to Your Excellency's attention, as it is a matter of common interest to the governments of the United Nations that the Convention protecting the rights of prisoners of war, which was signed and ratified by Germany be strictly observed by all belligerents.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to you, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

For the Netherlands Ambassador:

The Honorable the Secretary of State
U.S.Department of State, Washington, D.C.

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H4315 - 0058

M.

# DESTRUCTION IN THE HARBOUR OF ROTTERDAM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE BOMBARDMENT OF 14TH MAY 1940 AND OF THE DEMOLITIONS BY THE GERMAN WEHRMACHT AS FROM SEPTEMBER, 1944.

Of the quays in dep water, the following were destroyed :-

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| Quays for piece goods. | 4.350 $M^1$ | (about 30%) |
| Quays for bulk goods | 2.300 $M^1$ | (about 85%) |
| Reserve | 300 $M^1$ | |
| | 6.950 $M^1$ | = 42.5% of all fully equipped quays. |

The warehouse capacity decreased by 190.000 $M^2$ because of total destruction of the warehouses. Of the remaining 340.000 $M^2$, part was damaged but can be repaired. About 40% has been lost.

Of the 252 cranes on land(mostly travelling cranes) 16 were taken away and 80 destroyed.
Of the 26 loading bridges 7 were taken away and 17 destroyed.
Of the 80 floating cranes 30 have disappeared: part of them are in Germany.
Practically all tank space has been heavily damaged.

Municipal docks.
Of the 4 municipal floating docks the largest (of 15,000 tons) was used, as mentioned above, to block the Maas harbour. The dock broke into 3 pieces in the process. Of the smaller municipal docks (of 6,000, 4,000 and 2,000 tons) the machine-installations were destroyed and the docks themselves were sunk.

Shipbuilding yards. Of the shipbuilding yeards of "De Rotterdamsche Droogdok Mij"., "de Nieuwe Waterweg", "Gusto", "Piet Smit", "van der Giessen", and "Boele", the electrical installations, a large part of the cranes and crane rails, and part of the machine tools were destroyed.

## DESTRUCTION AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE GERMAN BOMBARDMENT MEDIO MAY 1940.

The bombardment of 14 May 1940 destroyed an area of Rotterdam of 250 HA., comprising that part of the town which is bound by the Willemskade, the railway station Delftsche Poort and the Oudedijk, as well as the neighbourhood of the Maas-station. This means that the centre of the town and a large part of the residential area Kralingen were lost. Of this area a part, of 158 H.A. was built up, the remainder, about 100 HA. consisted of 255 streets, squares and roads. The destroyed part occupied about one eighth of the surface of the town, which is about equal to that part of Amsterdam which is surrounded by the Prinsengracht, or to the whole town of Groningen.

The bombardments destroyed the following houses, buildings etc: about 11,000 separate houses, with room for 24,582 families; 13 bank buildings, 12 cinemas, 2 theatres, 19 consulates, 4 newspaper offices, 31 factories, 1319 workshops, 22 public halls, 21 municipal buildings (except schools), 19 churches, amongst which the Groote or St. Laurens Church, 10 charitable institutions, 517 cafe's and small hotels, 31 large stores and shops, 2320 small shops, 4 Government buildings, 62 schools, 13 hospitals, 26 hotels, 237 insurance offices, 1150 other offices, 4 railway stations, 675 warehouses and bonded warehouses, and many other large and small buildings such as garages, autobus companies, despatch services, transport agencies, shipping agencies, charterers' and freighters' offices etc. Roads, sewerage, gas and water mains, electric cables, street lighting, rails and overhead wires of the tram system were heavily damaged. There were about 78,500 homeless people and 874 dead.

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